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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this dissertation is to study the impact of U.S. federal renewable fuel 
regulations on energy and agriculture commodity markets and welfare. We consider two 
federal ethanol policies: the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) contained in the Energy 
Security and Independence Act of 2007 and tax credits to ethanol blenders contained in the 
Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008.  My first essay estimates the distribution of 
short-run impacts of changing federal ethanol policies on U.S. energy prices, agricultural 
commodity prices, and welfare through a stochastic partial equilibrium model of U.S. corn, 
ethanol, and gasoline markets. My second essay focuses on studying the price behavior of the 
renewable fuel credit (RFC) market, which is the mechanism developed by the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to meet the RFS. RFCs are a tradable, bankable, 
and borrowable accounting mechanism to ensure that all obligated parties use a mandated 
level of renewable fuel. I first develop a conceptual framework to understand how the market 
works and then apply stochastic dynamic programming to simulate prices for RFCs, examine 
the sensitivity of prices to relevant shocks, and estimate RFC option premiums. My third 
essay assesses the impact of policy led U.S. ethanol on the markets of global crude oil and 
U.S. gasoline using a structural Vector Auto Regression model of global crude oil, U.S. 
gasoline and ethanol markets. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
The Renewable Fuel Standard that is contained in the Energy Security and 
Independence Act (2007) mandates 36 billion gallons of renewable fuel use by 2022. 
Responding to previous mandates and high energy prices, U.S. corn-based-ethanol 
production increased from 4 billion gallons in 2005 to 9 billion gallons in 2008 substituting 
6.25% of our gasoline consumption. Ethanol production in the 2008 marketing year used 
3.667 billion bushels of corn accounting for 26.7% of total corn production. The government-
supported ethanol market has linked U.S. corn and gasoline markets together, fundamentally 
changing the determination of agriculture commodity prices both in the United States and 
abroad. 
The link between agriculture and energy through renewable fuel raises many 
important questions. My first essay examines the short-run impact of changing ethanol 
policies including the RFS and the blenders’ tax credits by addressing the following two 
questions: What would happen to the markets of corn, ethanol, and gasoline, if U.S. ethanol 
policies change tomorrow? Who would win and who would lose? The second essay focuses 
on the RFS and the renewable fuel credits market, also known as the Renewable 
Identification Number (RIN) market developed by the EPA to facilitate compliance with the 
RFS. This new market for RINs leaves many unanswered questions including: what is the 
price behavior of RINs, and how sensitive are these prices to relevant shocks?  My third 
essay measures the impact of policy-led ethanol market shocks on U.S. gasoline and global 
crude oil markets using a structural vector auto-regression model.  
The first essay “Impacts of Changing Ethanol Policies on the Distribution of Prices 
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and Welfare” presents a stochastic, short-run structural model of U.S. corn, ethanol, and 
gasoline markets to estimate the distribution of price and welfare impacts associated from 
changing federal ethanol policies on producers and consumers of corn, ethanol, and gasoline. 
We consider changes to two policies: the Renewable Fuel Standard and the current blenders’ 
tax credit. We introduce five stochastic variables to capture the primary sources of price 
uncertainty in these commodity markets including corn yield and global crude oil price. The 
model is calibrated to expected market conditions in February 2010 for the 2010 corn 
marketing year. We show that in the short run, elimination of both policies would decrease 
average corn prices by a total of 9.6%. Thus, a complete elimination of federal support for 
corn based ethanol would not bring corn prices back down to pre-ethanol levels in the short 
run. This might be surprising because the existence of corn ethanol industry is largely due to 
these supports. The reason why removal of these same policies has only a modest effect on 
corn price is because existing U.S. ethanol plants will only shut down if their variable cost of 
production is not covered. We also find that elimination of both programs would reduce corn 
price volatility by about 43% and this reduction in price volatility would also reduce option 
prices and directly affect revenue insurance premiums in the U.S. crop insurance program. 
Changes in ethanol policies would, however, have large distributional impacts. Corn 
growers, ethanol producers, and fuel consumers have an incentive to maintain high ethanol 
consumption, while gasoline and livestock producers have an incentive to reduce ethanol 
production.  
The second essay “Pricing Renewable Fuel Credits Under Uncertainty” develops a 
conceptual framework and a stochastic dynamic programming model to understand the prices 
of renewable fuel credit market, also called the Renewable Identification Number (RIN) 
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market, which was developed by the EPA to facilitate compliance with the Renewable Fuel 
Standard set by the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007. The creation of the RIN 
market poses a number of questions including how the RIN market functions, how RIN 
prices are formed, and which factors affect price levels and price volatility. Current analyses 
by Thompson, Meyer and Westhoff (2008a, 2008b, 2009) addressing these questions ignore 
the banking and borrowing provisions and the formation of markets for options on future 
RIN prices. We consider these provisions to be crucial to the study of current and future RIN 
prices and address them directly. We consider an agent's optimal use of renewable fuels and 
optimal investment in RINs over the regulated periods to meet their obligation under the 
Renewable Fuels Standard. An agent's first-order conditions from the multiperiod problem 
can be interpreted as temporal arbitrage conditions for RIN prices. We solve a stochastic 
dynamic programming problem to study the distribution of future RIN prices, to estimate the 
potential cost of options on RIN futures, and explore the current and future price impacts 
from relevant shocks. We estimate that the expected 2010 RIN price is $0.10 with a $0.08 
standard deviation. We also find that from 2010 to 2014, banking and borrowing provisions 
will save oil companies $5.56 billion, and eliminating tax credits will cost oil companies 
$17.6 billion but save tax payers $29.7 billion.  
The third essay “Assessing the Impact of U.S. Ethanol Market Shocks on Global 
Crude Oil and U.S. Gasoline: A Structural VAR Approach” develops a joint structural vector 
auto regression (SVAR)  model of the global crude oil market, U.S. gasoline and ethanol 
markets to examine how shocks in each market affect the other two. We observe that despite 
growing crude oil demand from emerging countries, global oil production has stagnated since 
2005. We hypothesize that at least part of this lack of response is due to the ever increasing 
 4 
government support for renewable fuels such as ethanol. We also examine responses of 
global crude oil price, U.S. gasoline price and U.S. gasoline consumption to ethanol demand 
and supply shocks. We find statistically significant responses of global oil production to 
ethanol demand shocks. Shocks to ethanol demand are mainly driven by government policies 
suggesting that oil producers may respond to the U.S. government support for renewable 
fuel. We do not find a statistically significant impact of shocks to ethanol markets on crude 
oil prices, suggesting that ethanol is not yet a big enough player in the transportation fuel 
market for its impact on crude oil to be measured empirically. Our results also show that 
ethanol demand and supply increases cause statistically significant drops in real gasoline 
prices, but do not affect the growth rate of gasoline consumption significantly. Unanticipated 
shifts in demand and supply for all three markets are evaluated to determine their impacts on 
real prices of crude oil, U.S. gasoline and U.S. ethanol.  
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CHAPTER 2. IMPACTS OF CHANGING ETHANOL POLICIES ON 
THE DISTRIBUTION OF PRICES AND WELFARE 
Introduction 
Before corn ethanol, energy prices affected crop prices mainly through their impact 
on production costs. Federal support for corn ethanol has fundamentally changed this 
relationship. The new role of energy prices and U.S. ethanol policies in determining food and 
fuel prices has renewed the importance of understanding the fundamental determinants of 
commodity prices. Elobeid et al. (2006) and Tokgoz et al. (2007) estimate the long-run 
impacts of ethanol on agriculture using a zero-profit condition on the ethanol sector to 
determine the long-run price of corn. Gardner (2007), and de Gorter and Just (2009a,b) use 
supply and demand curves to determine the welfare impacts of ethanol policies that affect the 
price of corn. The policies examined include stylized mandates, and tax credits. These studies 
have increased our understanding of the relationship between crude oil prices (or gasoline 
prices) and the long-run price of corn. But corn consumers, policymakers, and farmers are 
also interested in how crude oil prices and biofuels policies affect the price of corn in the 
short run. The short-run link between crude and corn is complicated by uncertain corn 
supplies, the time it takes to add ethanol capacity, and the existence of federal mandates. 
Figure 1 illustrates how variations in crude oil prices affect corn prices in the short 
run. Corn supply in excess of non-ethanol corn demand is depicted by XC. The equilibrium 
corn price is found by the intersection of this excess supply curve and the derived demand for 
corn from the ethanol industry, shown initially by the demand D0. At any time there is a 
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maximum amount of corn that can be processed into ethanol because of industry capacity 
constraints. This is denoted as the vertical line labeled CAP. Federal mandates, in the form of 
the Renewable Fuels Standard (denoted by RFS
1
), place a lower limit on ethanol demand and 
domestic ethanol production. In figure 1, industry capacity exceeds RFS, which has been the 
case so far.  
 
Figure 1 Impact of a crude oil price shock on the price of corn 
 
A change in crude oil prices will shift the derived demand for corn because ethanol is 
                                                 
1
 The RFS originated from the Energy Policy Act 2005, and was expanded by the Energy Independence 
and Security Act 2007. The new RFS mandates 36 billion gallons of renewable fuel use by 2022 and breaks into 
four specific mandates: corn ethanol, cellulosic ethanol, bio-based diesel, and other advanced biofuels. Here we 
specifically look at the corn ethanol mandates. 
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a substitute for gasoline. As long as the equilibrium quantity in the ethanol market falls 
between RFS and CAP price, changes in crude oil prices directly affect corn prices. 
However, when the equilibrium quantity falls below RFS, as it does with demand D1, then 
drops in crude oil prices have no impact on corn prices, because RFS places a floor on the 
demand of corn from ethanol. Prfs in figure 1 denotes the price of corn when the ethanol 
production is equal to RFS. For crude oil prices that result in equilibrium quantities greater 
than CAP, as is the case with demand D2, hikes in crude oil prices have no impact on corn 
prices, because industry capacity places a ceiling on the demand of corn from ethanol, at 
least until additional capacity can be added. 
Analysis of ethanol policy is complicated by these floors and ceilings. The U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was required to analyze a 2008 request by 
Governor Perry of Texas to reduce the ethanol mandate. To conduct such an analysis requires 
consideration of the probability distribution of crude oil prices. If the equilibrium quantity of 
ethanol exceeds RFS for all possible crude oil prices, then there is no impact of a reduction in 
the mandate. If there is some range of crude oil prices that makes the mandate binding, then 
policy impacts must be calculated with reference to the distribution of crude oil prices. 
Estimation of the impact of crude oil prices on the volatility of corn prices is also 
complicated by the floor and ceiling. Crude oil price volatility will be directly reflected in the 
volatility of corn prices for equilibrium prices between RFS and CAP in figure 1, but not for 
corn quantities above and below. Thus, the pricing of put and call options for corn will be 
impacted by the floor and ceiling demand of corn from ethanol. The magnitude of the impact 
will depend on the probability that the ethanol industry operates at capacity and that the 
mandate binds. 
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Variations in corn supply complicate the analysis further, as shown in figure 2. To 
simplify, figure 2 assumes that the demand for corn consists of feed demand and ethanol 
demand. The total demand for corn (CABD in figure 2) is simply the horizontal summation 
of the two. Total demand is a parallel shift of feed demand for quantities of corn in excess of 
feed demand plus the capacity constraint, and for quantities less than feed demand plus the 
RFS. The price of corn is determined by the location of the supply curve. For corn supplies 
between points A and B, the price of corn is driven primarily by variations in demand from 
the ethanol industry. For corn supplies to the left of A and to the right of B, the marginal 
buyer of corn is the livestock industry and the short-run elasticity of demand for livestock 
feed will determine how high the price will go in short-crop years and how low the price will 
go in bumper-crop years. The kinks in demand and the role of uncertain supply show the 
need for careful modeling of corn demand and supply volatility for short run analysis. 
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Figure 2 Impact of a corn supply shock on the price of corn 
 
The contribution of this essay is the analysis of the price and welfare impacts of 
alternative ethanol policies in the short run. The analysis is conducted with a stochastic 
partial equilibrium model that explicitly accounts for important sources of volatility in the 
corn market as well as the existence of maximum and minimum effects of crude oil prices on 
the price of corn. The model follows the simplified models shown in figures 1 and 2 taking 
into account the important factors that determine the price of corn, including stochastic corn 
supply, crude oil prices, natural gas prices and capacity of the ethanol industry. The model is 
calibrated to expected market conditions in February of 2010 for the 2010 corn marketing 
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year. The distribution of prices and welfare impacts from changing U.S. ethanol mandates 
and tax credits are calculated using the calibrated model. The results provide useful insights 
about the short-run impacts of federal ethanol policies on welfare, price volatility, and the 
inherent trade-offs involved when a food crop is used to produce biofuels. 
A Stochastic Model of the Markets of U.S. Corn, Ethanol, and Gasoline 
To understand fully the relationship between crude oil and corn prices and the impact 
of policies on this relationship, we develop short run demand and supply curves for gasoline, 
ethanol, and corn, include the impact of policy variables on these curves, and introduce five 
stochastic variables to the model. The demand and supply curves are calibrated to the latest 
Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute (FAPRI) baseline report, the Energy 
Information Administration (EIA)’s Short-Term Energy Outlook, and available market 
information before the model is run. We solve for three market clearing prices conditional on 
realizations of the stochastic states of the world. Expected prices and estimates of the price 
volatility of corn, ethanol, and gasoline are obtained by solving the model for multiple draws 
of the random variables and then taking averages and standard deviations of prices across all 
draws. The distributions of prices are conditional on available information at the date the 
model is run. 
We capture the main uncertainty of three markets by introducing the following 
stochastic variables: planted acres, corn yield
2
, ethanol industry capacity, the price of crude 
oil, and the price of natural gas. The marginal distributions of these variables and the 
                                                 
2
 The corn supply curve is vertical as in figure 1, but the quantity of the fixed supply is a random variable at 
the time the model is solved because harvested acres and yield are not known.  
 11 
correlation among these variables are discussed in detail below. This stochastic model is 
flexible and has been continuously updated to recognize new market conditions. As changes 
in the distributions of stochastic variables and parameter estimates available, new versions of 
the model are simulated.  
The supply and demand of each market are specified to include two policy variables. 
First, the blenders’ tax credit ($0.45-per-gallon Volumetric Ethanol Exercise Tax Credit) 
included in the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 is a direct subsidy given to 
ethanol blenders, which increases the willingness of blenders to buy ethanol. Hence the 
blenders’ tax credit effectively shifts out the derived demand for corn from ethanol. The 
second policy variable is the RFS contained in the Energy Security and Independence Act of 
2007 ensures that ethanol consumption is at least equal to the mandated level. If the mandate 
binds, the price of ethanol must increase to induce ethanol plants to produce the mandated 
level. Table 1 lists the four specifics of renewable fuel standards. Please note that mandates 
are for the overall biofuels and for the advanced and cellulosic levels. However, FAPRI 
projects that cellulosic biofuels, advanced biofuels, biodiesel production will not exceed 
mandated level, meeting the overall mandate necessarily requires enough corn ethanol to be 
produced. For this reason, we include a conventional biofuels mandate in Table 1. More than 
99% of US ethanol imports were Brazilian sugarcane ethanol, which is qualified for meeting 
advanced mandate specified by the EPA. Because of the high probability of advanced 
mandate binding
3
, we argue that imported sugarcane ethanol RINs will be used to meet 
                                                 
3
 The advanced biofuels mandate increases to 1 billion gallon for 2014, but FAPRI's projection of US 
ethanol imports is less than 500 million gallons for 2014. So it makes economic sense for blenders to save their 
extra advanced biofuel RINs when they anticipate in the future years that the mandate has a high probability of 
binding. 
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current advanced mandate or be rolled over to meet future advanced mandate. For this reason 
we do not include import tariff for our baseline.
4
 Under this specification we then simulate 
prices under different policy scenarios. The model specification and results reported below 
are based on the information of February 2010. 
Year Conventional 
Biofuel 
(billion 
gallons) 
Cellulosic 
Biofuel 
(billion 
gallons) 
Biodiesel 
(billion 
gallons) 
Other 
Advanced 
Biofuel 
(billion 
gallons) 
Total 
RFS 
(billion 
gallons) 
2008 9 0 0 0 9 
2009 10.5 0 0.5 0.1 11.1 
2010 12 0.1 0.65 0.2 12.95 
2011 12.6 0.25 0.8 0.3 13.95 
2012 13.2 0.5 1 0.5 15.2 
2013 13.8 1 1 0.75 16.55 
2014 14.4 1.75 1 1 18.15 
2015 15 3 1 1.5 20.5 
2016 15 4.25 1 2 22.25 
2017 15 5.5 1 2.5 24 
2018 15 7 1 3 26 
2019 15 8.5 1 3.5 28 
2020 15 10.5 1 3.5 30 
2021 15 13.5 1 3.5 33 
2022 15 16 1 4 36 
  Table 1 Renewable Fuel Standard of the Energy Independence and Security Act 20075 
 
Corn Supply 
The corn supply equals corn production plus the beginning stock of corn. Corn 
                                                 
4
 The next chapter will explain RFS and RINs in a greater detail.  
5
 Source: http://www.ethanolrfa.org/resource/standard/   
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production equals the product of harvested acreage and yield per harvested acre. Harvested 
acreage equals planted acreage times the percentage of acres harvested. Corn production is 
thus defined by ( * )Sc c c cQ A h y   where 
S
cQ  denotes the corn production, cA  is planted 
acreage of corn, ch  is the percentage of acres harvested, and cy  is yield per harvested acre.  
U.S. yields from 1957 to 2009 reported by the National Agricultural Statistics Service 
(NASS) are used to estimate a beta distribution of yield per harvested acre to represent 
uncertainty about 2010 corn yields. These yields are first de-trended using a linear trend and 
constant coefficient of variation.
6
 The average percent deviation multiplied by the 2010 trend 
yield from FAPRI is used to estimate the standard deviation, maximum, and minimum of 
2010 yield. The estimated marginal distribution for 2010 corn yield: 
(1)  
1
1
( )( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )( )
y
y y
p
y y c c c c
c p q
y y c c
p q y y y y
p y
p q y y

 
   

  
 
 
where 187cy , 119cy , 6.2yp  and 1.7yq  . Because yield is mainly affected by 
weather, we assume it is independent from other stochastic variables; that is, we assume that 
harvested yield is independent of planted acreage, ethanol industry capacity, crude oil price, 
and natural gas price.  
We use the difference between prospective planted acreages from USDA’s annual report 
that is released in March and the actual planted corn acreage from 1965 to 2007 to obtain a 
distribution of stochastic planted acreage subject to the March report.
 
 Because USDA’s 
“Prospective Planting” report won’t be released until the end of March, we use FAPRI 2010 
                                                 
6
 More sophisticated trend models were fit to the yield model, but the 2010 projected trend yield and the 
estimated percent deviations from trend over the time series differed little from those obtained from a simple 
linear trend. 
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baseline prediction of 89.6 million planted acres of corn in 2010 to be the mean planted 
acreage. The standard deviation of these historical differences between the predicted acres and 
the actual acres is 2.155 million acres. There was no discernable increase over time in the 
accuracy of this report. Therefore we assume the marginal distribution of farmers’ intended 
planted acreage in 2010 (in million acres) )215.2,6.89(~ NAc . FAPRI predicts that U.S. 
farmers will harvest 91.8% of planted acres, so we set 0.918ch  .  
It is reasonable to expect a positive correlation between planted acres and crude oil 
prices, because a high crude oil price shifts up the demand for ethanol and therefore the 
demand of corn from ethanol and the price of corn. An anticipated high price for corn will 
lead farmers to plant more corn. To estimate the correlation between planted acres and corn 
prices, we look at the change of December corn futures prices from March 1
st
 to April 30
th
 
for each year from 1990 to 2008 and the difference between the predicted acreage of USDA 
March prospective plantings report and the actual planted acreage for each year from 1990 to 
2008. Figure 3 plots the acreage difference and price difference for each year and indicates 
no strong positive correlation. For all years except 1997, 2000, and 2004, the two differences 
indicate either no correlation or negative correlation. For example, in 2007, the December 
corn futures prices dropped but the actual planted acres were 3 million more than the 
predicted indicated by March prospective planting report. In 2008, the actual planted acres 
were almost the same as the predicted acres, while the futures price of corn went up from 
$5.7 to $6.3 per bushel. Therefore we assume that after farmers make their planting decisions 
in March, they will not plant more if a high corn price is observed before May, that is, the 
marginal distribution of planted acreage is independent from corn prices. Because crude oil 
prices affect planted acres through corn prices, we assume the marginal distribution of 
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planted acreage is independent from the distribution of crude oil prices. We do not assume 
that the farmers’ planting decision is independent from crude oil price, but only assume that 
the fluctuation of crude oil prices from March to May will not change their planting decision 
made in March. If a positive correlation does exist, high crude oil price leads to more acres 
and lower corn price and lower cost of producing ethanol, and then more supply for ethanol, 
thus lowers the probability of mandate binding. We also assume that planted acreage is 
independent from other random variables including ethanol industry capacity and natural gas 
prices.  
 
Figure 3 Scatter plot of changes of December corn futures price and planting acreage 
from March 1
st
 to April 30
th
 (1990-2008) 
  
Corn Demand 
Non-ethanol demand for corn equals the sum of four demands: food (food and seed and 
HFCS), feed (feed and residual), stocks, and exports. All four demands are modeled as linear in 
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the average price $3.71 per bushel received by farmers in 2010 as reported by FAPRI. 
Parameters for these demand curves are obtained by using short-run own-price elasticity of 
demands
7
 from FAPRI and calibrating to FAPRI baseline projection which will be released in 
March 2010. FAPRI projected that food, feed and export demand would be 1.297 billion, 5.274 
billion, and 2.017 billion bushels, and ending stocks would be 1.6 billion bushels for the 2010 
marketing year. The resulting four demand curves are
,food
,2010 ,20101388 24.5
D
c cQ P   ; 
,feed
,2010 ,2010 6271 170
D
c cQ P   ; )*8.10785.5603,1000max( 2010,
,
2010, c
storageD
c PQ  ; and 
,export
,2010 ,20103933 516.5
D
c cQ P   . We assume there exists a floor demand of 1 billion bushels for 
corn storage demand, which is estimated by the lowest storage to use ratio from 1990 to 2008. 
8
 
The demand of corn from the ethanol industry is determined by ethanol production 
capacity E, the percentage of capacity that is in operation , and the number of bushels of corn 
required to produce a gallon of ethanol : ,D ecQ E     .  
Ethanol industry capacity for the 2010 marketing year was unknown in February of 2010. 
Thus it is treated as a random variable. Lists of plants on-line and under construction are tallied 
by the Renewable Fuels Association.
9
 It suggests that industry capacity on January 19
th
, 2010 
was around 13 billion gallons and capacity under construction was around 1.432 billion gallons. 
We assume that the maximum capacity for the 2010 marketing year is 14.5 billion gallons, the 
minimum capacity is 13 billion gallons, and the expected capacity is 13.5 billion gallons. A beta 
                                                 
7
 Short-run price elasticity of feed demand is -0.19; price elasticity of food demand is -0.07; price elasticity 
of export demand is -0.95; and price elasticity of storage demand is -2.5. 
8
 It takes time for corn to go from where it is stored to where it is used. Thus there is always a minimum 
amount of corn that is in the pipeline. This is called pipeline storage. We will never run out of corn because of 
pipeline storage. 
9
 Renewable Fuel Association (RFA): http://www.ethanolrfa.org/industry/locations/ 
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distribution with shape parameters 1.3 and 2.5 is used to capture uncertainty. It is reasonable to 
assume that ethanol capacity is somewhat dependent on crude oil prices because the level of 
ethanol operating margins may affect the completion rates of plants that are under construction. 
There is no reliable data to estimate the correlation between capacity in 2010 and crude oil prices 
so a reasonable value of correlation of 0.3 is used. Because as we show later crude oil prices and 
natural gas prices are strongly correlated, capacity and natural gas prices are also positively 
correlated. A value of correlation between capacity and natural gas prices of 0.1 is used for 
simulation. A sensitivity analysis indicates that overall results are robust to changes in this 
correlation. Ethanol capacity is assumed to be independent from corn yield and planted acres, as 
we argued above. Correlated draws of ethanol industry capacity, natural gas, and crude oil prices 
were obtained by first drawing independently from their marginal distributions, and then using 
the Iman and Conover (1982) procedure to impose the desired amount of correlation. 
Negative processing margins will cause ethanol plants to shut down and reduce the 
percentage of capacity that operates. Because all plants pay about the same price for corn, those 
plants that produce the least ethanol per bushel of corn processed will tend to shut down first. 
Denote gallons of ethanol produced per bushel of corn as . The distribution of   across the 
industry determines the proportion of existing capacity that will operate given input and output 
prices. The production technology of current (as of February 2010) ethanol production capacity 
has a mean of 2.75 gallons per bushel. The maximum efficiency is assumed to be 2.85 gallons 
per bushel and a minimum efficiency of 2.5 gallons per bushel. There are no reliable data on 
which to base plant heterogeneity. A reasonable amount of heterogeneity is represented by fixing 
the variance equal to 0.005. Using a beta distribution again, the resulting shape parameters are 
2.85 and 1.14. 
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The operating margin per bushel of corn processed for a dry mill ethanol plant is  
  ( )E e distillers c ngP D P P OPC N P            where E  is the operating profit margin 
per bushel, eP  is the ethanol price per gallon, distillersP  is the distillers grains price per ton (1 ton 
equals 2,000 pounds), 
ngP  is the natural gas price per mmBtu, D  is tons of distillers grains per 
bushel, OPC  is other operating cost per gallon, and N is the units of natural gas required to 
process one bushel of corn. The other operating cost for a dry mill ethanol plant in the U.S. is 
$0.32 per gallon (F.O. Lichts and Agra CEAS consulting 2007).
10
 Every bushel of corn 
processed returns 17 pounds of DDGS, and 72.8 thousand British thermal units of natural gas are 
used to process one bushel of corn (CARD).
11
 
The marginal distribution of average price of natural gas in 2010 is assumed to be 
lognormally distributed. The mean of the distribution is estimated by the average NYMEX 
natural gas futures price of each month from September 2010 to August 2011 on February 5, 
2010. The estimated mean was $6.18 per mmBtu. Price volatility is obtained from the annualized 
implied volatilities for at-the-money call options of each month from September 2010 to August 
2011 on February 5, 2010. The annualized implied volatilities are multiplied by the square root of 
time to estimate the standard deviation of prices for each month from Sep. 2010 to Aug. 2011. 
Because the model is annual, the monthly means and standard deviations are converted to an 
annual mean and standard deviation of natural gas prices using standard formulas. For any set of 
random variables 1, , nX X , let 1(1/ )
n
i iY n X  . Then 
2 2
1 1 ,( ) (1/ ) ( ) 2(1/ ) ( ) ( )
n n
i i j ii i j i jVar Y n Var X n Var X Var X       where ,i j  is the 
                                                 
10
 F.O. Lichts, online database, Licht Interactive Data: http://www.agra-net.com/portal/.  
11
 Center for Agricultural and Rural Development: http://www.card.iastate.edu/research/bio/tools/. 
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correlation between iX  and jX . Thus, the correlation matrix for monthly prices is needed to 
estimate the volatility of the average price of natural gas for 2010. Historical monthly prices of 
natural gas from September 1976 to August 2008 are used to estimate the correlation matrix. 
Table 2 reports the correlation matrix of monthly natural gas prices. The estimated standard 
deviation for the distribution is 2.06. 
 
Natural 
gas Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug 
Sep 1 0.95 0.9 0.82 0.82 0.65 0.74 0.7 0.64 0.61 0.84 0.62 
Oct 0.95 1 0.97 0.85 0.91 0.76 0.87 0.85 0.79 0.75 0.93 0.74 
Nov 0.9 0.97 1 0.91 0.94 0.77 0.89 0.86 0.79 0.74 0.91 0.71 
Dec 0.82 0.85 0.91 1 0.9 0.76 0.86 0.82 0.74 0.7 0.81 0.63 
Jan 0.82 0.91 0.94 0.9 1 0.92 0.95 0.94 0.9 0.85 0.93 0.75 
Feb 0.65 0.76 0.77 0.76 0.92 1 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.84 0.84 0.72 
Mar 0.74 0.87 0.89 0.86 0.95 0.89 1 0.99 0.96 0.94 0.96 0.84 
Apr 0.7 0.85 0.86 0.82 0.94 0.89 0.99 1 0.98 0.96 0.95 0.83 
May 0.64 0.79 0.79 0.74 0.9 0.89 0.96 0.98 1 0.98 0.93 0.82 
Jun 0.61 0.75 0.74 0.7 0.85 0.84 0.94 0.96 0.98 1 0.92 0.84 
Jul 0.84 0.93 0.91 0.81 0.93 0.84 0.96 0.95 0.93 0.92 1 0.88 
Aug 0.62 0.74 0.71 0.63 0.75 0.72 0.84 0.83 0.82 0.84 0.88 1 
Table 2 Correlation matrix of monthly prices for natural gas 
 
Distillers grains are valued off of corn prices. The average price ratio of distillers grains 
to corn from January 2008 to January 2009 was 0.82. Therefore we 
assume , ,/ 2000 0.82 / 56distillers t c tP P  . There is a break-even efficiency level   for each 
realization of ethanol price, corn price, and natural gas price, , | 0E t     . Plants with efficiencies 
greater than this value will operate. Those with lower efficiencies will shut down. Therefore, 
( , , , ) Pr( )c e ngP P P      where   is the percentage of the ethanol capacity with a 
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nonnegative operating margin. The last component that defines the demand for corn from the 
ethanol industry is the average bushels of corn required to produce a gallon of ethanol for ethanol 
plants that are operating 1/ ( | )E     . 
Ethanol Domestic Supply 
The analysis above specifies the domestic supply of ethanol for the 2010 marketing year: 
( , , , )DSe c e ngQ E P P P    where 
DS
eQ  is the domestic ethanol supply.  
Ethanol Demand 
Ethanol demand is modeled as a segmented demand curve as follows. Demand by 
gasoline blenders up to 4 billion gallons is quite inelastic because ethanol’s use is mandated for 
some regions of the country that must meet clean air standards and because ethanol is the most 
economical source of octane in gasoline blends. Fuel blenders are assumed to use one gallon of 
ethanol to replace one gallon of gasoline and could continue to do so up to about 14 billion 
gallons, at which level all of the U.S. gasoline supply would consist of 10% blends. But ethanol 
distribution bottlenecks create a lower willingness to pay for ethanol below its intrinsic value in a 
fuel blend. Thus, the second segment of demand begins at 4 billion gallons and ends at 10 billion 
gallons. At 10 billion gallons, ethanol is assumed priced at its energy value. Tax credits increase 
gasoline blenders’ willingness to pay for ethanol by the amount of the subsidy. The Food, 
Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 reduced the blenders’ tax credit for corn ethanol from 
$0.51 to $0.45 per gallon starting January 2009. Therefore the demand curves of ethanol (in 
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billion gallons) in the 2010/11 marketing year are
12
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where ,
D
e tQ  is the demand of ethanol, etc is the $0.45 per gallon tax credit to the ethanol 
blenders, and ,
D
g tQ  is the demand of gasoline. As we indicated above, to meet the overall RFS 
blenders will need to use 12 billion gallons of conventional ethanol for 2010 and 12.6 billion 
gallons of conventional ethanol for 2011. As there are 4 months in 2010 and 8 months in 
2011 for the 2010/2011 marketing year, the mandate for corn ethanol for the 2010 marketing 
year is 12.4 billion gallons.  
Blended Fuel Demand 
Because ethanol is a substitute for gasoline, increases in ethanol consumption will reduce 
the demand for gasoline. However, a lower ethanol price will decrease the price of ethanol-
blended gasoline, thus increasing the demand for ethanol-blended-gasoline and the demand for 
gasoline. So the net effect of ethanol on the demand and price of gasoline is ambiguous. The 
demand for ethanol-blended gasoline, 
D
fQ , is made a linear function of the ethanol-blended-
                                                 
12
 These curves are intended to capture fuel blenders’ willingness to pay for ethanol.  
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gasoline price, 
fP , which is an average price of ethanol and gasoline weighted by the market 
share of ethanol: ( ) (1 )f e e gP P tc P        where /( )e e gQ Q Q
    . Here we assume that 
ethanol blenders pass the benefit of tax credit to final fuel users. Adjusting for the energy value of 
ethanol yields the total quantity of fuel: 0.678
D D D
f e gQ Q Q   . Here we model demand for 
mileage, which can come from either gasoline or ethanol.  
The blended fuel demand curve is calibrated to the Energy Information Administration 
(EIA)’s short-term energy outlook (February 2010). The demand for motor gasoline for the 2010 
marketing year is 140.2 billion gallons and the demand for ethanol is 12.6 billion gallons. 
Adjusting for the energy value of ethanol, the total demand is equivalent to 148.7 billion gallons 
of motor gasoline. The price of gasoline from the EIA short-term energy outlook of $2.29 per 
gallon and price of ethanol from the futures market of $1.72 are used to calculate a weighted 
average price of composite fuel of $2.26 per gallon. With a short-run price elasticity of gasoline 
demand of -0.34 (Brons et al. 2008), the fuel demand curve (in billion gallons) for the 2010 
marketing year is f
D
f PQ *37.2226.199    and the gasoline demand (in billion gallons) for the 
2010 marketing year is 
D
e
D
f
D
g QQQ *6781.0 . 
Gasoline Supply 
In the long run, the growth in biofuels affects both the mix and volume of new refinery 
capacity that is needed. However, in the short run, U.S. refinery capacity is fixed. Thus, increased 
ethanol supply will only affect the mix of refinery products. Assume that U.S. refineries take 
output prices and input prices as given and attempt to adjust the optimal mix of outputs to 
maximize profits. The profit-maximizing gasoline supply is a function of the price of gasoline 
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relative to distillate fuels and the price of gasoline relative to crude oil. As the focus of this model 
is the gasoline market, the domestic gasoline supply is made a function of the price of gasoline 
relative to crude oil (Dahl 1981) with a short-run price elasticity of supply 0.77 (Tsurumi 1980). 
The gasoline supply curve is calibrated to the EIA’s short-term energy outlook. The domestic 
gasoline supply is 127 billion gallons, the average RBOB gasoline price is $2.29 per gallon, and 
the average crude oil price is $82.25 per barrel for the 2010 marketing year. Thus, the U.S. 
gasoline supply curve (in billion gallons) for the 2010 year is )/(*9746.124 crudeg
DS
g PPQ  . 
The average price of crude oil is assumed to follow a lognormal distribution. The method 
used to estimate the distribution of crude oil prices follows the method used to estimate the 
distribution of natural gas prices. Monthly prices of Oklahoma WTI crude oil from September 
1986 to July 2008 were used to estimate the correlation matrix of monthly crude oil prices.
13
 
Table 3 reports the historical correlation matrix of monthly crude oil prices. The estimated mean 
for the average crude oil price for 2010 is $76.06 per barrel and the estimated standard deviation 
is 26.56. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13
 http://www.eia.doe.gov . 
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Crude 
oil  Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug 
Sep 1 0.99 0.98 0.97 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.94 0.93 0.94 0.9 
Oct 0.99 1 0.99 0.98 0.97 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.91 
Nov 0.98 0.99 1 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.91 
Dec 0.97 0.98 0.99 1 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.93 
Jan 0.96 0.97 0.98 0.99 1 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.95 
Feb 0.96 0.96 0.98 0.99 0.99 1 1 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.96 
Mar 0.95 0.96 0.97 0.98 0.98 1 1 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.98 
Apr 0.95 0.96 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99 1 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.98 
May 0.94 0.95 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99 1 1 1 0.98 
Jun 0.93 0.95 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99 1 1 1 0.98 
Jul 0.94 0.95 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99 1 1 1 0.99 
Aug 0.9 0.91 0.91 0.93 0.95 0.96 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.99 1 
Table 3 Correlation matrix of monthly prices for crude oil 
The correlation (0.918) between Oklahoma WTI crude oil annual prices and the U.S. 
natural gas wellhead prices was estimated using annual prices from 1986 to 2007.  
U.S. gasoline imports depend on the price difference between U.S. gasoline and foreign 
gasoline, transportation costs, trade policies and other factors. We use global crude oil price to 
approximate for the price of foreign gasoline and assume that US gasoline imports are a function 
of the price ratio of U.S. gasoline and global oil. There are no available data on the price 
elasticity of gasoline import supply, so monthly data from January 2005 to June 2008 were used 
to estimate the elasticity of gasoline import supply to the price ratio of U.S. gasoline to crude. As 
there is no trend indicated in the monthly data for this period, we control for hurricanes and 
the summer driving season, and estimate the following regression equation 
(3)  summerhurricane
crude
gIS
g DD
P
P
Q *13.0*19.0)
42/
ln(*44.033.10)ln(    
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where 
IS
gQ  is gasoline import supply (the monthly finished gasoline import), hurricaneD  is the 
hurricane dummy, and 
summerD is the summer dummy. All of the estimated coefficients are 
statistically significant at 5% significance level and the adjusted R-square is 0.4881. 
The estimated elasticity of gasoline import supply to the relative per gallon price of 
gasoline to crude 
1
gIS
  is 0.44. EIA predicts the gasoline import supply to be 12.1 billion gallons 
for the 2010 marketing year in the January 2010 Short-Term Energy Outlook. Using the 
estimated elasticity, we calibrate the gasoline import supply curve to the EIA Short-Term Energy 
Outlook. Thus, the gasoline import supply 
IS
gQ  (in billion gallons) is 
)/(*3215.1937176.6 crudeg
IS
g PpQ   and the total gasoline supply 
S
gQ  is .
S DS IS
g g gQ Q Q   
Equilibrium in the Corn, Ethanol, and Fuel Markets 
For each realization of yield, acreage, ethanol production capacity, natural gas price 
and crude oil prices, the equilibrium prices of corn, ethanol and gasoline are solved when 
three markets clear: 
(4)  
ethanolD
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tc
storageD
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where 
storage,
1,
D
tcQ    is the beginning stock of corn at time t . 
(5)  
IS
te
DS
te
D
te QQQ ,,,   
 
We assume no borrowing is allowed, the demand for ethanol 
D
teQ ,  should be equal or greater 
than 12.4 billion gallons. If the mandate binds, then we solve for the price of ethanol that 
induces enough plants to produce 12.4 billion gallons. 
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(6)  
IS
tg
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tg
D
tg QQQ ,,,   
 
Results 
The price and welfare impacts of changing U.S. ethanol policy varies significantly with 
the level of crude oil prices, as shown in figure 1, and with the realization of other important 
random variables, including corn supply. Thus, it is important not only to simulate equilibrium 
market prices with respect to the distributions of exogenous random variables but also to report 
the distribution of results. Thus, results are generated for 1,000 sets of draws of all random 
variables in the model. The sample moments across the 1,000 solutions represent the distribution 
of production, price, and welfare impacts of alternative U.S. biofuels policies. The same set of 
1,000 draws is used for all scenarios to avoid confounding the effects of variations in draws with 
the effects of the alternative policies.  
The model is run using information available in February 2010. Results for four 
alternative policy scenarios are generated. These four are (1) a baseline set of policies that 
maintain the EISA mandate and the blenders’ tax credit; (2) removal of the mandate, 
continuation of the tax credit; (3) removal of the tax credit, continuation of the mandate; and (4) 
removal of both policies.   
The EPA is responsible for promulgating regulations to ensure that gasoline sold in the 
U.S. contains the mandated volume of renewable fuel specified by the RFS. The obligated parties 
of the RFS are refiners, importers, and certain blenders of gasoline. To enable universal 
compliance, the EPA developed a renewable fuel credit trading program called Renewable 
Identification Number (RIN) Exchange. A RIN is a gallon of ethanol. The system requires a RIN 
to be issued with each shipment of biofuels. Blenders can use the RIN for their own compliance 
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or they can sell excess RINs to others through the RIN Exchange.
14
 The market price of RIN is 
the difference between the demand and supply prices of ethanol. RIN price is positive when the 
mandate is binding. 
Welfare impacts on market participants are calculated as follows. The change in 
consumer surplus for domestic feeders, corn importers, food users, ethanol blenders,
15
 and fuel 
users
16
 is estimated using the demand curves. The change in producer surplus for gasoline 
producers and gasoline exporters is estimated using their supply curves. The change in producer 
surplus for ethanol producers are approximated by the change in the quasi-rent to ethanol 
producers because 2010 production capacity is not modeled as a function of the price of ethanol. 
The quasi-rent to ethanol producers is equal to 
,( 0.32) [ (17/2000) (72.8/1000) ]DS D ee e c c distillers ngP Q Q P P P        . If the capacity is not 
fixed, ethanol producer surplus would be larger under certain baseline scenarios when the 
industry runs at full capacity. Because of this, eliminate either policy would overestimate the loss 
for ethanol producers. The change in producer surplus of corn growers is approximated by the 
change in corn revenue, because the production decision and costs are assumed to be the same 
across the scenarios. We do not model corn supply response because the planted acreage is 
assumed to be fixed, thus we overestimate the loss of corn producers from elimination of ethanol 
support policies. Welfare estimates demonstrate magnitudes of transfers among consumers and 
                                                 
14
 Blenders are also given the option to bank RINs for future compliance or borrow RINs under special 
circumstance. For our simulation, we assume away banking and borrowing provisions and that mandates have 
to be met each year.  
15
 The consumer surplus of ethanol blenders (the area under the blenders’ ethanol demand curve) measures 
the net benefit of blending ethanol to meet performance requirements and clean air standards. The obligated 
parties who blend ethanol are gasoline producers and importers.  
16
 The consumer surplus of using ethanol as a substitute for fuel is captured by the fuel demand curve. 
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producers of corn, ethanol, and gasoline.  
Values of policy parameters that vary by calendar year are transformed to the model’s 
2010 marketing year (September 1, 2010 to August 31, 2011). The tax credit is set at $0.45 per 
gallon based on the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008.  To meet the total RFS, 12 
billion gallons of corn-based ethanol are needed in 2010 and 12.6 billion gallons are needed in 
2011. With two-thirds of the 2010 marketing year in 2011, this translates into a requirement of 
12.4 billion gallons for the marketing year. The mandate does not reflect the possibility of a 
credit for exceeding the RFS in previous and future years.  
Baseline Results 
The first row of results in Table 4 reports the mean of the 1,000 equilibrium solutions 
under the baseline set of policies. For the 2010 marketing year, our baseline corn price 
distribution has a mean (the expected price) of $4.04 per bushel
17
 and a price volatility of 21.4%, 
which is lower than the implied volatility 34% for the at-the-money corn call option on February 
18
th
, 2010 at the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT). Our estimated price volatility is lower, 
because our model only captures the major uncertainty in the market. The mean for ethanol 
producer prices, RBOB gasoline prices, and blended fuel prices are $1.998, $2.266, and $2.204 
per gallon. On average, 99.1% of ethanol domestic production capacity is operating and average 
domestic ethanol production is 13.37 billion. The high ethanol production level is due to the high 
operating margin, about 40 cents per gallon, for an average efficient ethanol plant under the 
                                                 
17
 The average corn price of baseline scenario is above FAPRI’s prediction $3.71 per bushel. Even though 
the demand of corn from food, feed, export, and storage are assumed to be linear in price and similar to the 
FAPRI model, demand of corn from ethanol is nonlinear in price. The beta distribution of efficiency index 
along with short-run shut down condition determines the percentage of ethanol plants operating. Our projection 
about demand of corn from ethanol is higher, because our model predicts higher ethanol price and higher 
ethanol industry capacity utilization and production.   
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average market condition. The probability that the mandate binds is 7%. This probability implies 
that removing the mandate will have a relative small price and welfare impact because removal 
of the mandate will have no impact on 93% of the model solutions. RIN prices are positive for 
7% of scenarios when the mandate is binding and RIN prices are zero for 93% of scenarios when 
the mandate is not binding. The average 2010 RIN price is 1.15 cents.  
 
Policy Scenario
Corn 
price 
($/bu)
Ethanol 
producer 
price 
($/gal)
Gasoline 
price 
($/gal)
Fuel price 
($/gal)
Ethanol 
production 
(million gal)
Ethanol 
industry 
capacity 
utilization
Gasoline 
production 
(million 
gal)
Gasoline 
imports 
(million gal)
Probability 
mandate 
binds
Mandate, Tax cedit 4.039 1.998 2.266 2.204 13371 99.1% 127578 13312 7%
Tax credit 4.010 1.988 2.268 2.205 13304 98.6% 127582 13319
Mandate 3.896 1.652 2.271 2.219 12859 95.3% 127584 13324 48%
No Programs 3.649 1.570 2.296 2.238 12041 89.2% 127620 13400
Tax credit -0.7% -0.5% 0.1% 0.1% -0.5% -0.5% 0.00% 0.1%
Mandate -3.5% -17.3% 0.2% 0.7% -3.8% -3.8% 0.00% 0.1%
No Programs -9.6% -21.4% 1.3% 1.6% -9.9% -9.9% 0.03% 0.7%
Percentage change from baseline scenario
 
Table 4 Average price and production impacts from changing ethanol policies in 2010 
 
Mandate Elimination 
The second row of Table 4 shows the average price and production under the scenario 
with only tax credit and the first row of the second set results of Table 4 shows the average price 
and production impact from removing mandate. The welfare impacts (mean, standard deviation, 
median, minimum, and maximum) of removing the mandate are presented in the first set of 
results shown in Table 5. For 93% of the solutions, removing the mandate has zero impact, 
because the blenders’ tax credit, high crude oil prices, and modest corn prices lead to a higher 
demand than the mandated level. When mandate is binding, removing the mandate would lead to 
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less ethanol demand, lower ethanol price and production, therefore less demand for corn from 
ethanol and lower corn prices. Average corn price across all draws would drop by 0.7%, the 
producer price of ethanol would drop by 0.5%, and ethanol production would drop by 0.5%. 
Note that the relatively small impact of removing the mandate is largely a result of the mandate 
only binding 7% of the time. When the mandate is binding, removing the mandate would 
increase the demand for gasoline and the price of gasoline. Average ethanol-blended-gasoline 
price would increases by 0.1%.  
The welfare impacts of eliminating the mandate equal zero in 93% of model solutions in 
which the mandate does not bind. Thus, the median welfare impact is zero. Ethanol blenders 
would win, because in 7% of the cases blenders would not need to incur extra cost to use more 
than the profit maximizing level when the mandate is removed. On average, corn growers would 
lose about $300 million and this loss occurs when enforcement of the mandate maintains ethanol 
production even when corn prices would otherwise dictate that ethanol plants would shut down. 
Ethanol producers and fuel consumers would also lose $29 million and $233 million from 
mandate elimination. Overall, eliminating the mandate transfers wealth from corn growers to 
corn users and from fuel users to gasoline producers. Note that the magnitude of welfare transfers 
among consumers and producers is sensitive to the assumed price elasticity of supply and 
demand. 
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Policy 
Scenario
PS of 
Corn 
Growers
CS of 
Domestic 
Feeders
CS of 
Food 
users
CS of corn 
Importers
CS of 
ethanol 
blenders
PS of 
Ethanol 
Producers
Government 
Revenue
CS of 
Fuel 
users
 PS of 
gasoline 
producers
 PS of 
gasoline 
importers
Mean -299 135 36 27 993 -29 30 -233 283 31
Stdev 1374 627 167 117 3665 131 141 1080 1315 148
Median 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Maximum 0 6090 1646 992 16440 0 1406 0 12715 1614
Minimum -12964 0 0 0 0 -1160 0 -10277 0 0
Mean -1736 724 182 237 -1322 -4193 6017 -2203 566 58
Stdev 1970 833 211 258 1850 2221 170 2011 1943 204
Median -1139 452 111 172 -197 -5274 6041 -1780 309 33
Maximum 0 3437 879 1062 0 0 6371 0 4701 637
Minimum -8158 0 0 0 -5580 -6371 5580 -6585 -4839 -480
Mean -4,527 1,964 497 617 -257 -4,442 6,017 -5,151 3,759 397
Stdev 5131 2290 586 665 347 1893 170 5033 3,708 401
Median -2373 943 233 357 -168 -5274 6041 -3824 2,787 289
Maximum 0 9363 2498 2111 1897 -751 6371 0 15,613 2,016
Minimum -19538 0 0 0 -1601 -6371 5580 -16279 0 0
Tax credit
Mandate
No 
Programs
 
Table 5 Distribution of welfare changes from alternative ethanol policies ($ millions) 
 
Tax Credit Elimination 
Our baseline results show that the probability of mandate binding is 7%. The impacts of 
eliminating tax credits from baseline are different based on whether the mandate is binding or 
not. If the mandate is binding for the baseline scenario, eliminating tax credits would not change 
the demand, supply, or producer price of ethanol, nor would it change the demand of corn from 
ethanol or the price of corn. But elimination of tax credits would increase the consumer price of 
ethanol, which would allow the blended fuel price to increase. The increased blended fuel price 
would lead to a lower demand for blended fuel, and thus a lower demand for gasoline because 
demand for ethanol stays the same equal to the mandate. A lower demand for gasoline would 
reduce the gasoline price. Therefore, removing tax credits when the mandate is binding would 
hurt fuel users, gasoline producers, and gasoline importers. For the non-binding-mandate baseline 
scenario, eliminating tax credits would decrease demand, supply, and producer price of ethanol, 
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and also decrease the demand of corn from ethanol and the price of corn. Meanwhile, a decreased 
demand for ethanol might lead to an increased demand for gasoline, which would lead to a higher 
gasoline price. Removal of the tax credit when the mandate is not binding would hurt corn 
growers, ethanol blenders, ethanol producers and fuel users. It would increase government 
revenue and benefit domestic feeders, food users, corn importers, and gasoline producers. 
However, the impact would be modest because the mandate would keep ethanol demand and 
production high. Because the mandates only bind for 7% of the baseline cases, the average 
impact reflects the effect of tax credit elimination from the non-binding-mandate baseline 
scenarios.  
Corn prices would drop by an average of 3.5% from the baseline level. Expected ethanol 
production would drop by about 3.8% and the expected ethanol producer price would drop by 
17.3%. Even though ethanol producer prices would drop, ethanol prices for fuel users would 
increase because of the removal of ethanol tax credits. The drop in ethanol demand would allow 
gasoline consumption and prices to increase. Therefore, blended fuel prices would actually 
increase 0.7%. On average, 95.3% of ethanol domestic production capacity would be operating. 
The probability that the mandate is binding would be 48%. This high probability demonstrates 
that tax credits and mandate both work to increase demand for ethanol. Average RIN prices will 
increase to 11.25 cents. For 7% baseline scenarios when the mandate is binding, eliminating tax 
credits increases RIN prices by about 45 cents; for 41% scenarios when the mandate is not 
binding in the baseline but becomes binding after eliminating tax credit, RIN prices are positive 
and increase by less than 45 cents; for the rest 52% scenarios when mandate is not binding even 
after eliminating tax credit, RIN prices are zero.  
On average, such a policy change would increase expected government revenue by about 
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$6 billion. Domestic feeders, food users, and corn importers from the U.S. would gain about 
$724 million, $182 million, and $237 million. Gasoline producers and importers would gain 
$566 million and $58 million. Corn growers, ethanol blenders, ethanol producers, and fuel users 
would lose $1.74 billion, $1.3 billion, $4.2 billion, and $2.2 billion.  
Both Programs Eliminated 
A rollback of both ethanol incentives would have the largest impacts. The expected price 
of corn would drop by almost 9.6% from the baseline level, to about $3.65 per bushel. The loss 
of tax credits would cause the producer price of ethanol to drop by 21.4% but the expected fuel 
price would increase by 1.6% because of an increase in the price of gasoline and consumer price 
of ethanol. Domestic ethanol production would drop by 9.9% and domestic gasoline supply 
would increase by 0.03%. On average, 89.2% of ethanol plants would be operating. The average 
loss to fuel consumers, corn growers, ethanol producers, and ethanol blenders would be $5.15 
billion, $4.5 billion, $4.44 billion, and $ 257 million. Ethanol blenders’ loss is relatively small 
because the benefits of tax credits are mainly passed onto the fuel users. The average gain to 
gasoline producers, domestic livestock feeders, corn importers, food users, and gasoline 
importers would be $3.76 billion, $1.96 billion, $617 million, $497 million, and $397 million. 
Tax payers would gain by more than $6 billion. Note that the magnitude of welfare transfers 
among consumers and producers is very sensitive to the assumed price elasticity of supply and 
demand. For example, if we assume more elastic gasoline supply, domestic livestock feeder 
might become the biggest winner from elimination of both programs instead of gasoline 
producers.  
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Impacts of a Short Crop 
Generating a set of 1,000 solutions not only provides estimates of the distribution of 
price and welfare impacts but also provides a deeper understanding of the fundamental 
relationships among ethanol policy, crude oil prices, and the price of corn. For example, 
elimination of the mandate would have its greatest impact when either corn yields are low or 
crude oil prices are low because either event increases the probability that the mandate binds. 
If one examines the baseline results for the lowest 20% of corn yields, one can determine the 
likely impacts of a short crop, which is defined here as a one-in-five-year low corn yield. 
Table 6 reports the price and production impacts of changing ethanol policies under a short 
corn crop scenario. For these low yields, there is a 35% probability that the mandate binds. 
Elimination of both ethanol policies in these short-crop years would reduce the average corn 
price by 20.9%, from $5.26 to $4.16 per bushel. In these years, livestock feeders and food 
users would gain about $6.88 billion from relief from the high corn prices. Although corn 
farmers would lose $12.3 billion on average from elimination of the programs, their average 
revenue from the corn crop at $47 billion in these short-crop years is only 8.6% lower than 
they would receive on average in the other four years out of five with both programs in place. 
That is, elimination of the programs in short-crop years would leave corn farmers largely 
unscathed while helping non-ethanol corn users by driving down the price of corn. Fuel users 
would be hurt by elimination of the programs in short-crop years. The price of gasoline 
would increase by 3% because of the decrease in ethanol production, and the ethanol 
producer price would drop by 19.5%. However, the elimination of tax credits would increase 
the price consumers pay for ethanol, so the overall impact is a 3.6% increase in blended fuel 
prices.  
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Policy Scenario
Corn 
price 
($/bu)
Ethanol 
producer 
price 
($/gal)
Gasoline 
price 
($/gal)
Fuel price 
($/gal)
Ethanol 
production 
(million gal)
Ethanol 
industry 
capacity 
utilization
Gasoline 
production 
(million 
gal)
Gasoline 
imports 
(million gal)
Probability 
mandate 
binds
Mandate, tax credit 5.262 2.039 2.270 2.212 12971 95.9% 127606 13370 35%
Tax credit 5.136 1.997 2.279 2.219 12678 93.8% 127621 13402
Mandate 5.026 1.924 2.259 2.232 12400 91.7% 127589 13334 100%
No Programs 4.160 1.641 2.339 2.293 9864 73.0% 127704 13576
Tax credit -2.4% -2.1% 0.4% 0.3% -2.3% -2.3% 0.0% 0.2%
Mandate -4.5% -5.6% -0.5% 0.9% -4.4% -4.4% 0.0% -0.3%
No Programs -20.9% -19.5% 3.0% 3.6% -24.0% -24.0% 0.1% 1.5%
Percentage change from baseline scenario
 
Table 6 Price and production impacts of changing ethanol policies in 2010 under a 
short corn crop scenario 
 
Impacts on Price Volatility and Option Prices 
The impact of federal ethanol policies on the volatility of corn prices can be measured by 
comparing the variability of corn prices in the baseline relative to the variability of equilibrium 
prices when either or both policies are eliminated. Mandate makes the top segment of corn 
demand curve (AC) in figure 2 more inelastic, and thus increases the price volatility of corn. 
Therefore, elimination of mandate would reduce price volatility. Tax credits reduces the top 
segment of less elastic corn demand (from AC to A’C in figure 2), shifts up the middle segment 
(from AB to A’B’), and increases the bottom segment of less elastic corn demand (from BD to 
B’D). Elimination of tax credits would also reduce price volatility because the probability of corn 
demand equal to the CAP (ethanol industry capacity running at full capacity) is more than 50%. 
Elimination of both programs would reduce price volatility by about 43% to 12%. Because the 
price of options is positively correlated to the level of price variability, elimination of both 
policies would reduce option prices. To illustrate, the average value of an at-the-money call 
option across the 1,000 equilibrium baseline prices is $0.349 per bushel. The value of an at-the-
 36 
money option on corn prices across the 1,000 equilibrium prices with no programs is $0.174 per 
bushel, a reduction of 50%.  This reduction in price volatility would also directly affect revenue 
insurance premiums in the U.S. crop insurance program.   
Conclusions 
Estimation of the distribution of short-run price and welfare impacts of changes in U.S. 
ethanol policies requires a detailed understanding of the stochastic relationships between energy 
prices, operating margins of ethanol plants, corn supply, and ethanol policies. A model that 
captures these relationships is used to estimate the price and welfare impacts of a change in U.S. 
ethanol policy for the 2010 marketing year. Policy changes are estimated relative to a baseline 
policy that includes EISA ethanol mandates and the current blenders’ tax credit. Impacts on the 
average market prices of corn, ethanol, and gasoline from partial and complete removal of these 
policy instruments are estimated, and changes in average producer surplus, consumer surplus, 
and government revenue are estimated. 
Our results show that in the short run, a change in U.S. policy would not have a large, 
immediate impact on corn prices, because ethanol plants will keep operating as long as their 
revenue covers their operating cost. A rollback of both incentives would decrease the expected 
corn price by 9.6%. A change in ethanol policies would also affect the price that consumers pay 
for transportation fuel. Elimination of both programs would increase the expected blended fuel 
price by 1.6%. On average, this would reduce fuel users’ consumer surplus by $5.15 billion. 
Because both the blenders’ tax credit and the mandate increase the demand for ethanol, 
elimination of one of these would not have a large impact on domestic ethanol production. 
Removing both would decrease domestic ethanol production by 9.9%. 
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CHAPTER 3. PRICING RENEWABLE FUEL CREDITS UNDER 
UNCERTAINTY 
Introduction 
The Renewable Fuels Standard (RFS) is a provision of the Energy Policy Act 2005 
which mandated 7.5 billion gallons of renewable fuel by 2012. The Energy Independence 
and Security Act (EISA) 2007 expanded the mandate for biofuels to 36 billion gallons by 
2022. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is responsible for promulgating 
regulations to ensure that gasoline sold in the United States contains the required volume of 
renewable fuel on an annual average basis. To facilitate compliance with the RFS of EISA 
2007, EPA developed a renewable fuel credit trading program. Gasoline producers and 
importers (obligated parties) are required to blend certain percentage of renewable fuel into 
their gasoline. For each gallon of renewable fuel blended, they get one renewable fuel credit, 
which has a 38 unit code called Renewable Identification Number (RIN). Therefore 
renewable fuel credits are also called RINs for short. Each obligated party must give EPA a 
specified number of RINs to remain in compliance with the RFS. 
Firms that generate RINs in excess of their obligations can sell their excess RINs to 
obligated parties that do not have sufficient RINs to meet their mandate. Obligated parties 
can bank RINs from the previous year to meet up to 20% of their annual mandate. Obligated 
parties are also allowed to fall short of their blending requirement in a year, if there are 
special circumstances. That is, they can borrow RINs from their future obligation as long as 
they meet their full obligation in the next year plus the deficit from the previous year. 
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Furthermore, EPA permits non-stakeholders to buy and sell RINs. Therefore, RINs function 
as an environmental currency and the RFS and RINs together act as a system of floor and 
trade.  
The RIN market poses a number of new questions, including how the RIN market 
functions, how RIN prices are formed, and which factors affect price levels and price 
volatility. Existing papers that attempt to address these questions include Thompson, Meyer 
and Westhoff (2008a, 2008b, 2009). They use the FAPRI-Missouri biofuels model to predict 
RIN prices in the medium term. Their papers do not provide a conceptual framework for the 
RIN market and they ignore banking and borrowing provisions. 
Our approach begins by considering an agent's optimal use of renewable fuels and 
optimal investment in RINs over the mandated period to meet the environmental regulation. 
The mandate is finite so we use dynamic backward induction to solve an agent's multiperiod 
production and investment choice problem. This approach provides a microeconomic 
foundation for an agent's optimal production and investment strategies. The agent's first-
order conditions from the multiperiod problem can be interpreted as temporal arbitrage 
conditions for RIN prices. At each period, firms equate the expected marginal cost of 
blending an additional gallon with the expected price of RIN. Expected RIN prices must 
increase at the interest rate. 
This microeconomic model of an individual firm's behavior is used to construct an 
aggregate model where all firms collectively behave like a central planner. This model's 
parameters are calibrated in order to simulate RIN price behavior under a number of 
scenarios. This model is stochastic so actual RIN prices may differ significantly from their 
expected path. When a shock occurs, the path from that moment on has to be recomputed, 
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taking into account the number of RINs that have been banked. For example, when a positive 
feedstock supply shock that decreases the cost of producing and blending biofuels occurs, the 
price path drops. The cost decrease will lead to higher blending levels when the shock is 
realized and less demand for RINs in the future. The impact of a crude oil price shock on the 
price paths is also analyzed. 
We measure the distribution of future RIN prices and measure the magnitude of the 
impact from shocks, by solving a stochastic dynamic programming problem to find optimal 
decisions in the RIN market by forward-looking agents. We include the two most relevant 
stochastic variables to capture the primary sources of uncertainty in the market: feedstock 
yields and crude oil prices. Guassian quadrature is used to generate draws with associated 
probabilities defining the states of the world. Given states of the world, we use backward 
induction to solve the optimal blending decisions at each state and for each period. This 
approach allows us to estimate RIN options in addition to the relevant shocks' impact on RIN 
values. 
Conceptual Model 
This model considers an expected-cost-minimizing agent's optimal use of biofuels 
and optimal investment in RINs over a finite horizon to meet Renewable Fuel Standard. 
18
 
Solving an agent's multiperiod production and investment choice problem provides a 
theoretical framework for an agent's optimal production and investment strategy. The 
agent/firm is a representative gasoline producer/importer required to blend a certain 
                                                 
18
 We choose finite horizon instead of infinite horizon model because the RFS ends in 2022. Without RFS 
in place, RIN prices will be zero.  
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percentage of biofuels into their gasoline pool.  
Setup 
Consider a firm, i, that has two control variables: ite , the quantity of biofuels blended 
each period, and ity , the quantity of RINs bought ( 0)ity   or sold ( 0)ity  at price 
tp , which will be determined by the equilibrium conditions of all firms in the RIN market 
over T periods. The level of RINs that are in the bank, ( )iS t , is a state variable. 
Following Rubin (1996), Cronshaw and Kruse (1996) and Kling and Rubin (1997), 
the cost function for firm i, ( )itc  , is the minimum cost of blending it ite   by firm i. It is 
assumed that itc  is twice continuously differentiable: 0itc
   and 0itc
  . ite  is firm i's actual 
blending level at t with RFS requirement. it  is firm i's optimal voluntary biofuels blending 
level at t without RFS requirement
19
. 
The problem facing a single agent (ethanol blender) 
We assume that the agent is a price-taker in the RIN market. In addition, it is assumed 
that there are no transaction costs or taxes when buying or selling RINs. In the presence of 
uncertainty, the agent will seek to minimize the sum of the expected discounted cost to meet 
blending obligations under the RFS: 
                                                 
19
Firms choose the optimal amount of renewable fuel blending to maximize net benefits, that is,  
max ( ) ( )
it
it it it it
B C

   where ( )
it
B   and ( )
it
C   are the benefit and cost functions of blending biofuels for firm 
i at time t. Thus,  ( ) ( )
it it it it
B C 
   
  : at the optimal voluntary blending level, the net marginal benefit of 
blending an additional gallon of renewable fuel equals zero for each firm at each period without the Renewable 
Fuel Standard. 
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(7)  
 
0
,
0
min [ ( ) ]
it it
T
t
it it it t it
e y
t
E c e p y 

  
   
  
   
subject to 
(8)  
1
0
( )
0, 0
0
m
it it it it it
i iT
it
S e y e S
S S
e
   
 

  
where   is the discount factor, equal to 1/ (1 )r  where r  is the interest rate; itS  is the 
number of RINs in the bank at time t. 0iTS implies that RINs will be used up before the 
end of the regulation. This is true as long as RIN prices are positive. Only when RIN prices 
are zero, the number of RINs might be positive at the end of regulation. We assume 
unlimited banking and borrowing of RINs for the model
20
.  
The information and decision variables available to the agent at each period are 
explained as follows. At each date t, the agent knows the number of RINs in her bank 
account S 1it  . Conditional on information at date t, denoted by tI , she also knows the 
distributions of future one-period RIN prices |
tp t
F I  and costs | ,
tc t
F I   for dates 
1, , 1.t T     Date t information, ,tI  includes all realizations of the number of RINs in 
the bank and optimal blending level without regulation for all dates up until and including 
date t. tI  also includes the optimal blending level with regulation and optimal investment in 
                                                 
20
The EPA only allows banking for up to 20% of the annual mandate and borrowing in special 
circumstances. The EPA never allows borrowing for two consecutive periods. However, the EPA did not define 
special circumstances and limits on production capacity in the ethanol industry ensure that aggregate banking 
will not exceed 20% of the annual mandate. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume full accounting of banking and 
borrowing. 
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RINs for all dates up until and including date t-1. Moreover, tI  could include any other state 
variables known at date t that affect the distributions of future RIN prices and cost structure 
of blending. Based on this information, the individual's date t decision variable are blending 
level 
ite  and optimal investment in RINs .ity   
Following Pennacchi (2007), let 1( , , )it tJ S I t  denote the derived minimum cost 
function. It is defined as follows: 
(9)  1
, , ,
( , , ) min [ ( ) ]
is is
T
T s
it t t is is is s is
e y i s
s t
J S I t E c e p y 


  
    
  
   
We will solve ite  and ity  using backward induction. 
(10)  1
, ,
( , ) min [ ( ) ] min ( )
iT iT iT iT
iT T iT iT iT T iT iT iT iT T iT
e y e y
J S T E c e p y c e p y          
subject to 
(11)  1 0
m
iT iT iT iT iTS e y e S        
which is equivalent to 
(12)  1 1
,
( , ) min ( ) ( )
iT iT
m
iT iT iT iT T iT iT iT
e y
J S T c e p e S e        
We differentiate the above equation with respect to the choice variable iTe .  
(13)  
1
( )iT iT iT T
m
iT iT iT iT
c e p
y e S e
 
 

 
  
  
The top equation of (13) says that at the last period each agent equates her marginal cost of 
blending an extra gallon to meet the regulation to the RIN price. In the last period, the firm 
will use up all banked RINs and blend enough to meet the last year's obligation. 
Now working backwards, consider the agent's optimization problem at date T-1. She 
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has a single period left in her planning horizon. 
(14)  
1 1
2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
,
( , 1) min ( ) ( ) [ ( , )]
iT iT
iT iT iT iT T iT T iT
e y
J S T c e p y E J S T 
 
              
subject to  
(15)  1 1 1 1 2
m
iT iT iT iT iTS e y e S          
That is, 
(16)  1 1
2 1 1 1 1 1
,
1 1 1 1 2
( , 1) min ( ) ( )
[ ( , )]
iT iT
iT iT iT iT T iT
e y
m
T iT iT iT iT
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     
    
   
   
  
To solve it, we differentiate with respect to 1iTe   and 1iTy  :  
(17)  
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2
1 1 1 1 1 2
( ) [ ( , )]
[ ( , )]
m
iT iT iT T S iT iT iT iT
m
T T S iT iT iT iT
c e E J e y e S T
p E J e y e S T
 

 
       
     
    
   
  
The top equation of (17) says that the agent's optimal blending level equates her 
marginal cost of blending an additional gallon in this period to her discounted marginal cost 
of an additional RIN in the bank account next period. The bottom equation of (17) says that 
the price of RIN this period equals the discounted marginal cost of increasing an additional 
RIN in the bank account next period. Therefore, the marginal cost of increasing an additional 
RIN in the bank at T is equal to RIN price at T Tp  , thus 1 1[ ].T T Tp E p   Both equations 
together also imply   1 1 1 1( )iT iT iT Tc e p
 
     ; which says that at date T-1, the agent equates 
her marginal cost of blending to the RIN price. 
Now working backwards more, we obtain the following: 
(18)  
( ) ,
[ ] 0, , .
it it it t
s t
t t s
c e p i t
p E p s t T


 

  
   
  
( ) ,it it it tc e p i t
     says that at each period, each firm blends the optimal amount of ethanol 
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to equate their marginal cost of blending to the RIN price. Firms with low marginal cost that 
blend more than the required quantity by the RFS supply RINs. Firms with high marginal 
cost that blend less than the required quantity by the RFS demand RINs. The aggregate 
demand and supply of RINs determines the price of RINs at each period. In equilibrium, total 
RINs sold or bought of all firms of all periods is equal to zero. Assume there are N  firms,  
(19)  
1 0
0
N T
it
i t
y
 
   
Banking and borrowing provisions lead to temporal non-arbitrage conditions. This 
expected price path is the defining characteristic of an active futures market. If expected RIN 
prices increase at a rate greater than the interest rate, we expect that firms will bank RINs. 
This will lead to higher demand for RINs this period and a higher RIN price for this period. 
Firms will continue banking until the expected RIN price increases at the interest rate. If 
expected RIN prices increase at a rate lower than the interest rate, we expect firms to borrow 
from the future. This will lead to less demand for RINs and lower RIN prices for this period. 
Firms will continue borrowing until expected RIN prices increase at the interest rate. 
21
 
Rubin (1996) proves that when allowed to trade with one another, units will 
collectively behave like a central planner who efficiently blend biofuels to minimize total 
costs. Thus, the expected RIN price is equal to the expected aggregate marginal cost of 
blending an additional gallon of biofuels: 
(20)  0 0[ ] [ ( )]t t t tE p E c e 
     
where ( )tc
   is the aggregate marginal cost of blending, 1
N
it ite e
 
   is the aggregate optimal 
                                                 
21
 Non-obligated parties’ participation will facilitate to achieve the equilibrium non-arbitrage conditions.  
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blending level at t and 
t  is the aggregate optimal voluntary biofuels blending level at t with 
the RFS requirement. The above equation gives us the following insight: firms with marginal 
cost of blending that is greater than the aggregate marginal cost of blending demand RINs. 
Firms with marginal cost of blending that is lower than the aggregate marginal cost supply 
RINs. In equilibrium, RIN prices clear the market. 
The problem facing all agents (ethanol blenders) 
Now we are ready to look at how blenders act in aggregate. Suppose the central 
planner chooses the amount of biofuels to blend each period to maximize the total discounted 
expected net benefits of blending renewable fuel under the constraint of meeting the RFS. 
(21)  
 
0
0
0
max ( ( , ) ( , ))
T
t
T
t
ttt t t t
e
t
E b e c e  

 
  
 
   
subject to 
(22)  
 
0 0
0
0
T T
m
t t
t t
T
t
e e
e
 


 
  
where ( )tb   are the aggregate benefit functions of blending renewable fuel at period t, and t   
is a vector of stochastic variables which affect the benefit of blending renewable fuel at 
period t;  ( )tc   are the aggregate cost functions of blending renewable fuel at period t and 
t is a vector of stochastic variables which affect the cost of blending renewable fuel at 
period t;  is the discount factor; te  are the quantities of renewable fuel blended at period t; 
m
te  are the minimum amount of renewable fuel required to be blended at period t. Equation 
(22) says that the central planner blends enough biofuels to meet the mandate over the 
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regulation period
22
 and ethanol blending is positive for each period.  
Then the Lagrangian is   
(23)  0
0 0 0
( ( , ) ( , ))
T T T
t m
ttt t t t t t
t t t
£ E b e c e e e   
  
   
      
   
     
This problem yields the following necessary conditions: 
(24)  
0
0 0
[ ( , ) ( , )] 0; 1, ,t ttt t t t
T T
m
t t
t t
E b e c e t T
e e
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 
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The first necessary condition yields the following: 
(25)  ( , ) ( , ) [ ( , ) ( , )]s tt st st t t t t s s t sb e c e E b e c e    
             
Equation (25) says that when the central planner blends the optimal level at each 
period, the expected net marginal benefit of blending an additional gallon increases at the 
interest rate. The second necessary condition says that the total optimal blending for all 
periods is equal to and greater than the total mandate.  
For this aggregate model, the extra cost of meeting the regulation is specified at the 
difference between the cost of producing the renewable fuel and the benefit of using the 
renewable fuel. To reconcile with the results from the single blender’s problem, we 
have 0 0[ ( , ) ( , )] [ ( )]tt t t t t t t tE c e b e E c e  
        . This translates into the 
following:
0 0( ) [ ( , ) ( , )]tt t t t t tE p E c e b e 
     ; which says that the expected RIN price are the 
expected difference between the aggregate marginal cost of producing the optimal amount of 
renewable fuel and the aggregate marginal benefit of blending the optimal amount of 
                                                 
22
 For the case when the total ethanol blending is greater than the total mandates, the benefit of blending 
more than total mandates is higher than the cost; which means, the total mandates are not binding. 
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renewable fuel. We also obtain that expected RIN prices increase at the interest rate:  
(26)  [ ] 0, , .
s t
t t sp E p s t T
      
Impact of shocks on expected RIN prices  
Actual RIN prices may be quite different from their expected price path. Let us 
consider what would happen with a positive feedstock supply shock and a subsequent drop in 
the cost of producing and blending biofuels occurs. The initial impact is an increase in 
blending and a decrease in the demand for RINs both in the current year and in the future. 
This drops the expected path of future RIN prices. The path of expected RINs prices will 
increase with a negative feedstock supply shock and an increase in the cost of producing and 
blending biofuels. The cost increase will lead to less biofuels production when the shock is 
realized and more demand for RINs in the future. 
Now consider what happens when an unexpected increase in crude oil prices occurs. 
Higher crude oil prices lead to a higher gasoline prices, which in turn leads to a higher 
willingness to pay for the substitute biofuels. Thus the marginal benefit of blending biofuels 
increases. This causes the price path for RINs to drop. The increased demand will lead to a 
higher blending level when the shock is realized and less demand for RINs in the future. The 
opposite will hold when an unexpected decrease in crude oil prices occurs. 
Simulation Model 
We calibrate the values and distributions of the aggregate model's parameters to 
reflect the corn ethanol RIN market conditions of December 2009 to simulate RIN price 
behavior under six scenarios. The RFS includes individual mandates for conventional 
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biofuels, cellulosic biofuels, other advanced biofuels, and biodiesel. We simulate RIN prices 
for corn ethanol as an example. Our simulation model can be modified to estimate RIN prices 
for cellulosic biofuels and biodiesel.  
Calibration 
Time is discrete and indexed by 0,1, ,t T   . T is set to be 4.23 The RFS sets the 
conventional biofuels mandate for 2010 at 12 billion gallons 
0 12
me  , 2011 at 12.6 billion 
gallons 
1 12.6
me  , 2012 at 13.2 billion gallons 2 13.2
me  , 2013 at 13.8 billion gallons  
3 13.8
me   and 2014 at 14.4 billion gallons 4 14.4
me  . Table 1 lists the specific mandates for 
conventional biofuel, cellulosic biofuel, biodiesel, other advanced biofuel and total RFS from 
2008 to 2022. We assume the number of carryover RINs from 2009 is zero. By setting T=4, 
we assume that the mandates from 2010 to 2014 have to be met in 2014. For an interest rate 
we use the annualized 3-month LIBOR rate of July 2009 1.5%
24
, which is traditionally used 
as an approximate of a risk-free rate. The discount rate for the theoretical 
model 1/ (1 1.5%)   25. 
                                                 
23
 The choices of time periods, the number of Gaussian Quadrature nodes, the finite grid for the number of 
RINs in the bank at T are made together to make computational costs feasible. The computational cost increases 
exponentially when we increase any of these three choices.   
24
 http://www.wsjprimerate.us/libor/libor_rates_history.htm  
25
 We also simulate the results with a 2.5% interest rate. RIN prices from 2010-2014 under this scenario are 
almost the same as those under the baseline scenario. Compared to the baseline results, the 2010 RIN price is 
about 0.2 cents lower, the 2011 RIN price is about 0.1 cents lower, the 2011 RIN price is the same, the 2012 
RIN price is about 0.1 cents higher, and the 2013 RIN price is about 0.2 cents higher. 
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Cost and benefit functions of blending ethanol 
Our theoretical model shows ( , ) ( , )tt t t t t tp c e b e 
    ; that is, the price of RIN is 
equal to the difference between marginal benefit and marginal cost of blending ethanol. The 
price tp  reflects the difference between the price that is needed to allow biofuels producers 
to cover the costs of producing the required amount of biofuels and the market value of 
biofuels to meet fuel demand (Babcock 2009). 
Feedstock costs are the largest determinant of production cost. The feedstock for 
conventional ethanol is corn. The most relevant stochastic variables t  affecting corn prices 
are crude oil prices otp  and corn yields stc . When yield is high, corn prices are low, all else 
equal. The higher the corn price, the higher the marginal cost of producing ethanol. We also 
assume decreasing return to scale production because of the following:  
First, increased ethanol production increases demand for corn from ethanol and also 
increases corn price. Therefore the cost of producing ethanol increases. Second, excess 
capacity of ethanol industry also implied that more ethanol production means less efficient 
plants turning on and higher cost of producing ethanol.  A change in crude oil prices will 
shift the derived demand for corn from ethanol, because ethanol is a substitute for gasoline. 
Therefore, the marginal cost curve is also a function of crude oil price. Following Thompson, 
Meyer and Westoff (2008b), we calibrate the marginal cost curve to the simulated data for 
2009 from the integrated model of McPhail and Babcock.
26
 The specific cost function used is  
                                                 
26
 The model includes the U.S. markets for corn, ethanol, gasoline, soybean, soybean meal, soybean oil, biodiesel 
and diesel. The supply and demand functions for each market include the following policy variables when applicable: 
the RFS for ethanol and biodiesel, and the blenders' tax credit to ethanol and biodiesel. The partially stochastic 
simulation is a defining characteristic of the model. Instead of point values for exogenous variables for future year 
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( , ) 2.20 0.00124 0.01241 0.00009t t t ot yt tc e p c e
         where the intercept includes all 
the other factors affecting the cost of blending ethanol, otp  is in dollars per barrel, ytc  is in 
bushels per acre, and te  is in million gallons.
27
 Biofuels substitute for petroleum-based fuels, 
therefore the price of crude is the single most important factor determining marginal benefits 
of blending biofuels. Thus the most relevant stochastic variable t  affecting marginal benefit  
( , )tt tb e 

is the crude oil price otp . Another important factor affecting the benefit is tax 
credits to ethanol blenders ,ttc  because tax credits to ethanol blenders increase their 
willingness to pay for ethanol. Following Elobeid et. al. 2007, we assume a perfectly elastic 
demand and a linear marginal benefit function. The parameters of the benefit function are 
also calibrated to historical data of annual crude oil price and gasoline price from 1980 to 
2008 from the Energy Information Administration. The specific benefit function used is  
( , ) 0.6781 (0.1842 0.0249 )tt t ot tb e p tc
       , where $0.45ttc  per gallon. By 
letting $0.45ttc  , we assume the current tax credit 45 cents per gallon will continue to 2014. 
The benefit function says that the marginal benefit of blending ethanol is equal to the energy 
value of ethanol plus tax credits to ethanol blenders. 
                                                                                                                                                       
simulations, exogenous variables are drawn randomly from distributions based on past variances and covariance. 
Crude oil and natural gas prices and corn and soybean yields are among the exogenous factors determined randomly. 
This model develops an acreage supply response under expected profit maximization to investigate the net effect of 
the federal biofuels policies and energy prices on the equilibrium allocation of U.S. corn and soybean acreages. 
27
 If farmers harvest 10 more bushels per acre on average, the estimated marginal cost implies that RIN 
price will decrease by about 10 cents. A bushel of corn produces 2.75 gallons of ethanol on average, so corn 
price will decrease by about 28 cents per bushel.  
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The stochastic nature of the world 
The stochastic nature of the world is captured by draws from the distributions of the 
stochastic crude oil prices
otp  and corn yields ytc . Corn yields are independent of crude oil 
prices because yield is mainly dependent on summer growing conditions in the United States 
Corn Belt. 
Corn yields are assumed independent over time in the sense that a bumper crop in 
2009 does not affect the probability of a bumper crop in 2010. The mean of corn yield is 
assumed to follow a linear upward trend. U.S. corn yields from 1980 to 2008 reported by the 
National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) are used to estimate the linear trend. The 
variation of corn yield each period is captured by a beta distribution. The same data are used 
to estimate the marginal beta distribution of corn yield to represent variation about 2010-
2014 corn yields. These yields are first de-trended using a linear trend. The average percent 
deviation multiplied by the trend yield is used to estimate the standard deviation of 2010 
yield. The marginal distributions of the 2010-2014 corn yields (in bushels per acre) are 
(Table 7 lists estimated parameters for each year):  
(27)  
1
1
( )( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )( )
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yt yt
c cyt yt
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c c yt yt yt yt
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p q c c c c
p c
p q c c

 
   

  
 
 
 
  Minimum Maximum p q 
2010 119 181 2.1777 1.3554 
2011 120 181 1.7352 0.959 
2012 122 184 1.7352 0.959 
2013 124 186 1.7352 0.959 
2014 125 188 1.7352 0.959 
Table 7 Estimated parameters for corn yield beta distribution
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Guassian quadrature is used to generate points and weights to discretize the beta 
distribution. The Matlab code by Miranda and Fackler is used to generate three possible corn 
yield points and associated probabilities for each year to approximate the beta distribution.
28
 
Guassian quadrature is one method used to approximate a definite integral of a function. It is 
usually stated as a weighted sum of function values at specified points within the domain of 
integration. Gaussian quadrature generates points and weights to exactly match the moment-
generating conditions. Guassian quadrature is used because it is the best way we can think of 
to estimate the expectation and variance of RIN prices. 2010 corn yield uncertainty is 
approximated by the following: 
0Pr( 132) 0.1631;yc    0Pr( 154) 0.5001;yc      
0Pr( 174) 0.3369.yc     
Crude oil prices in each year are assumed to follow a lognormal distribution. The 
mean of the distribution is estimated by the average NYMEX crude oil futures prices of each 
month for which a futures price is quoted. Price volatility is obtained from annualized 
implied volatilities for at-the-money call options of each month
29
. The annualized implied 
volatilities are multiplied by the square root of time to estimate the standard deviation of 
prices for each month. Because the model is annual, the monthly means and standard 
deviations are converted to an annual mean and standard deviation of crude oil prices using 
standard formulas. For any set of random variables  1, , nX X  , let  1(1/ ) .
n
i iY n X    Then  
                                                 
28
 The choices of time periods, Gaussian quadrature nodes, the finite grid for the number of RINs in the 
bank at T are made together to make the computational cost under control (curse of dimensionality). It is a 
compromise between computational cost and accuracy. 
29
 The futures prices and implied volatilities are obtained on Dec 7, 2009. 
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2 2
1 1 ,( ) (1/ ) ( ) 2(1/ ) ( ) ( )
n n
i i j ii i j i jVar Y n Var X n Var X Var X        where  ,i j   is the 
correlation between 
iX  and .jX  To estimate the variance for the annual mean price, the 
correlation matrix of monthly crude oil prices is needed to estimate the volatility of the 
average price of crude oil for any year. Monthly prices of Oklahoma WTI crude oil from 
September 1986 to July 2008 were used to estimate the correlation matrix. The estimated 
mean for the 2010 average crude oil price distribution is $75 per gallon and the annualized 
implied volatility is 40%. Guassian quadrature is used again to generate 3 prices and 
associated probabilities to approximate the lognormal distribution:  0Pr( 31) 0.1667;op    
0Pr( 60) 0.6667;op      0Pr( 118) 0.1667.op     
Following Gibson and Schwartz (1990), crude oil prices over time are assumed to 
follow a random walk with a drift. For example, if the realized 2010 average crude oil price 
is $36 per barrel, then the expected 2011 average crude oil price is$36 (1 )yield  . 
According to Hull (2009), yield measures the difference between futures price and spot 
price, which includes the cost of carry and convenience yield. The cost of carry measures the 
storage cost plus the interest rate. The convenience yield measures the benefit of holding the 
physical asset. We estimate the convenience yield by the NYMEX futures prices on 
December 7, 2009. For example, the yield implied by the NYMEX futures price is 8%. The 
volatilities for 2010 average crude oil price is approximately equal to 40%. Gaussian 
quadrature is applied again to generate three points and associated probabilities to 
approximate each lognormal distribution for average crude oil price. The evolution of crude 
oil prices from 2010 to 2012 is shown in Figure 4. The first price is the mean of the average 
annual prices of 2010. The second column presents 3 possible prices in 2010. The third 
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column presents 9 possible prices in 2011. The last column presents 27 possible prices in 
2012. 
 
Figure 4 Evolution of crude oil prices ($ per barrel) from 2010 to 2012 
 
The probability transition from each state in 2010 to each state in 2011 is as follows. 
There are 9 states in 2010 and 27 possible states in 2011. However, there are 81 instead of  
27 9 243   possible states for both 2010 and 2011.
30
 Following the same approach, we 
                                                 
30
 Given 3 possible crude oil prices 
1 2 3
0 0 0
( , , )
o o o
p p p  with probabilities 
1 2 3
0 0 0
( , , )
o o o
w w w and 3 possible corn 
yields 
1 2 3
0 0 0
( , , )
y y y
c c C with 
1 2 3
0 0 0
( , , )
y y y
w w w , there are 9 states in 2010 with associated probabilities  
 57 
generate crude oil price and corn supply for 2012, 2013, and 2014 and obtain states for all 
five years ahead. 
Stochastic backward induction 
Now we will use backward induction to solve ethanol blending levels for each state 
and for each period. 
We first define a finite grid for the number of RINs in the bank at T.
31
 The agent 
chooses the optimal ethanol blending level at T to minimize the cost of meeting the 
regulation at T, given the available information set at T. The optimal ethanol blending level 
has to be no less than the mandated level at T minus the number of RINs in the bank at T. At 
T, the agent knows the number of RINs in her bank account, the marginal cost and benefit of 
blending ethanol in year T, and optimal blending level for all dates up until year T. The agent 
                                                                                                                                                       
0 0 0 0
Pr( , ) 1, 2, 3; 1, 2, 3
i j i j
o y o y
p c w w i j     . For each crude oil price in 2010, there is a crude oil price 
distribution in 2011. If crude oil price is 
1
0o
p  in 2010, crude oil price in 2011 has a mean 1
0 (1 )op yield   and 
volatility 40% 13 / 12 .  We apply Gaussian quadrature again to generate 3 prices 
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p . There are 9 possible crude oil prices in 2010. We also get three corn yields points  
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probabilities 
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w w w from the 2011 corn yield beta distribution. There are 27 possible states in 2010. 
However, there are 81 instead of 27*9=243 possible states for both 2010 and 2011 because  
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p p h p p w h        
31
 For simulation, we set the maximum number of RINs banked to be 2 billion, the maximum number of 
RINs borrowed to be 2 billion, and the space between each point on the grid to be 100 million RINs. The 
choices of time periods, the number of Gaussian Quadrature nodes, the finite grid for the number of RINs in the 
bank at T are made together to make the computational costs feasible (curse of dimensionality).   
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also knows all the realizations of crude oil price and feedstock supply. 
For each realized pair of crude oil price and feedstock supplies at T-1, there are 9 
possible pairs of crude oil price and feedstock supply at T. Given the minimum costs for each 
of the 9 states at T, we obtain the expected minimum cost at T, and then solve for the 
quantity of ethanol blending under the specific state for T-1 which minimize the sum of the 
cost of meeting regulation at T-1 and the discounted expected minimum cost at T. We repeat 
this for each possible state at T-1 and obtain the ethanol blending level for each possible state 
at T-1. This exercise will be repeated from period T-2 until the first period. 
We will choose the optimal number of RINs in the bank which minimizes the sum of 
the discounted expected costs of meeting the total mandates over the 5 periods. Given the 
optimal blending level, we obtain the RIN prices for each state and for each period. 
European call option price simulation 
Given the simulated prices and associated probabilities, we use risk-neutral option 
pricing (Harrison and Kreps 1979) to estimate the European call option premium as follows 
(28)  [ max( ,0)] max( ,0)
rT rT
iT iT
i
c E e p K e w p K       
 
 
where r is the risk-free interest rate, 
iT
p is the simulated i th RIN price at maturity, iw is the 
probability associated with i th price, K is the strike price, and T is the time to maturity. 
Simulation Results 
We simulate the aggregate model by substituting values for model parameters and 
giving distributions to corn yields and crude oil prices. These values and distributions are 
chosen to reflect the corn ethanol RIN market conditions of Dec. 2009. We first set up a 
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baseline scenario before looking at the effects of five shocks to study the response of RIN 
prices to shocks as well as RIN option prices, which provides useful information for market 
players attempting to hedge RIN price risk. For this reason we also simulate European at-the-
money call option prices for each year from 2010 to 2014. All the parameters for this 
scenario are listed in the calibration section. Table 8 summarizes RIN price distribution 
statistics for baseline scenarios including the expectation, standard deviation, price volatility, 
and European at-the-money call option premium. Our baseline results show that the average 
2010 RIN price will be $0.10 with a price volatility of 80%. The uncertainty of RIN price 
comes from both the uncertainty of the cost of producing ethanol and the uncertainty of the 
cost of producing gasoline, which is the uncertainty of the benefit of using ethanol. The 
uncertainty of the cost of producing ethanol comes from both corn yield and crude oil price 
and the uncertainty of the benefit of blending ethanol comes from crude oil price. Without 
the RFS, ethanol blenders use the optimal amount of ethanol to maximize its profits. With the 
RFS in place, when the mandate is binding, ethanol blenders need to use more than the 
optimal amount of ethanol, and thus lose money for each gallon of ethanol used. The price of 
RINs measures the extra cost per gallon ethanol blenders need to incur to comply with the 
RFS. We simply multiply the average RIN prices by the mandated amount of ethanol for 
each period and estimate that the average cost of meeting RFS for gasoline producers is 
$6.74 billion. If banking and borrowing are not allowed, the expected RIN prices from 2010 
to 2014 are $0.0411, $0.1026, $0.1595, $0.2074, and $0.3857. We simply multiply the 
average RIN prices by the mandated amount and estimate the average cost of meeting the 
RFS without banking and borrowing is $12.301 billion. Thus the banking and borrowing 
provisions will save gasoline producers and importers $5.561 billion. Banking and borrowing 
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provision achieves a 45% cost reduction for gasoline producers to meet the RFS. 
 
RIN Prices 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
 
Baseline 
Expectations $0.0991 $0.1005 $0.1021 $0.1036 $0.1051 
Standard Deviation $0.09 $0.11 $0.13 $0.14 $0.17 
Price Volatility 89% 113% 124% 139% 161% 
Option premiums $0.04 $0.06 $0.07 $0.08 $0.09 
Table 8 Baseline results for RIN prices (2010-2014) 
 
Next we introduce the five most relevant shocks to the ethanol market: a shock 
originating from a crude oil price drop; a negative ethanol demand shock originated from a 
change in the blenders tax credit; a shock originating from a crude oil price increase; a 
negative supply shock originating from a short crop for the feedstock of producing ethanol; 
and a positive supply shock originating from a bumper crop for the feedstock. We simulate 
RIN price distributions for each year under these five scenarios.  
It must be emphasized that our model is based on estimated marginal costs for ethanol 
blenders and on forward-looking well-informed expectations. That is, our model simulates a 
well functioning market at equilibrium. Early results from the actual operations of the market 
during the years 2009 indicate that the market is not yet at equilibrium. The 2008 RIN prices 
are much cheaper than 2009 RIN prices after considering the time value of money, and 
ethanol blenders could benefit from banking 2008 RINs for their compliance with RFS for 
2009. One possible explanation for the persistent large price gap between 2008 RINs and 
2009 RINs is that obligated parties have not utilized their banking options.     
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Crude oil price shocks 
We first simulate what would happen if crude oil price drops. When crude oil price 
drops, gasoline prices decrease and the quantity demanded for gasoline increases. As a 
consequence, the willingness to pay for ethanol as a substitute for gasoline decreases and the 
demand for ethanol decreases. When the demand for ethanol decreases, the demand for corn 
decreases as well, therefore the price of corn decreases if the supply is fixed
32
. Thus, crude 
oil price drop also reduces the cost of producing ethanol. Taking into account the effect on 
both benefit and cost, the net effect of a crude oil price drop on the RIN price is positive. 
That is, the impact on the demand for ethanol is greater than the impact on the supply curve 
of ethanol, so the RIN prices increase with a drop in crude oil prices. The opposite holds true 
when crude oil price increases. 
We specifically simulate what would happen if crude oil price drops to $36 per barrel 
in 2010. Table 9 lists the expectation, standard deviation, price volatility of RIN prices for 
each year under this scenario. This drop in 2010 will lower the expected crude oil prices from 
2011 to 2014 because of the random walk assumption for crude oil prices. The low crude oil 
price reduces the benefit of blending ethanol as a substitute for petroleum, which leads to a 
higher expected RIN prices assuming the cost of blending ethanol stays the same. Compared 
to the baseline, expected RIN prices from 2010 to 2014 increase by about $0.18 (up 180%). 
 
                                                 
32
 The supply of corn is determined by planted acreage and yield per acre. Farmers make decisions about 
acreage based on the expectation. So when the crude oil price drop is realized, the planting decision is already 
made. 
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RIN Prices 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
 
Results under crude oil price drop 
Expectations $0.2834 $0.2876 $0.2920 $0.2963 $0.3008 
Standard Deviation $0.03 $0.10 $0.13 $0.17 $0.21 
Price Volatility 12% 36% 44% 56% 71% 
Table 9 RIN prices under crude oil price drop scenario 
 
We also simulate what would happen if crude oil price increases to $136 per barrel. 
Table 10 lists the expectation, standard deviation, and price volatility of RIN prices for each 
year under this scenario. An increase in the crude oil price will increase the marginal benefit 
of blending ethanol and shift down the path of expected RIN prices greatly. Our results show 
that expected RIN price drops to almost zero. The standard deviation for the RIN price 
distribution each period drops to almost zero as well. However, RINs still have value in this 
scenario because the probability of the mandate binding is positive. If the positive crude oil 
price shock was accompanied by elimination of the tax credit, then expected future RIN 
prices would be higher. 
 
RIN Prices 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
 
Results under crude oil price hike 
Expectations $0.0034 $0.0035 $0.0035 $0.0036 $0.0036 
Standard Deviation $0.00 $0.01 $0.01 $0.02 $0.03 
Price Volatility 21% 194% 351% 456% 822% 
Table 10 RIN prices under crude oil price hike scenario 
 
Policy shocks 
A negative demand shock can originate from a change in policy, such as elimination 
 63 
of the tax credits to blenders. If the federal government removes the current tax credits to 
blenders, blenders' willingness to pay for ethanol will decrease. Elimination of tax credits to 
blenders decreases the benefit of blending ethanol and increases RIN prices. Table 11 lists 
the expectation, standard deviation, and price volatility of RIN prices for each year under this 
scenario.  Under this policy shock expected RIN prices from 2010 to 2014 increases by about 
$0.26. This estimate is much lower than the $0.45 estimated by De Gorter and Just (2008) 
and Elobeid et.al. (2007). The reason is as follows: only under scenarios illustrated by Figure 
5 when the supply price of ethanol Ps (the cost of producing a gallon of ethanol) is higher 
than the demand price of ethanol (which is equal to the tax credit plus the cost of producing 
0.68 gallons of gasoline), elimination of the $0.45 tax credit will increase RIN prices by 
$0.45. Figure 6 shows that when the supply price of ethanol Ps is lower than the demand 
price of ethanol Pd, specifically, the gap between the cost of producing a gallon of ethanol 
and the cost of producing 0.68 gallons of gasoline is less than $0.45 per gallon, in which 
case, RIN price will increase by less than $0.45 after elimination of the tax credit. Figure 7 
shows that in some cases, the supply price of ethanol Ps is still lower than the demand price 
of ethanol Pd after eliminating tax credits, RIN price still will be zero. We estimate that 
eliminating tax credits will cost gasoline producers and importers $17.6 billion, but save tax 
payers $29.7 billion. 
 
RIN Prices 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
 
Results under tax credits elimination 
Expectations $0.3578 $0.3631 $0.3686 $0.3741 $0.3797 
Standard Deviation $0.18 $0.23 $0.26 $0.28 $0.32 
Price Volatility 50% 63% 69% 75% 85% 
Table 11 RIN prices under tax credit elimination scenario 
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Figure 5 The impact of eliminating tax credit on RIN prices (1) 
 
Figure 6 The impact of eliminating tax credits on RIN prices (2) 
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Figure 7 The impact of eliminating tax credits on RIN prices (3) 
 
Negative supply shocks 
A negative supply shock for ethanol can originate from a feedstock supply shortage. 
A short corn crop will increase corn prices, and thus increase the cost of producing ethanol. 
The increased cost of producing ethanol will increase RIN prices, all else equal. We 
characterize our negative supply shock as a realized corn yield of 132 bushels per acre in 
2010. Table 12 lists the expectation, standard deviation, and price volatility of RIN prices for 
each year under this scenario.  
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RIN Prices 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
 
Results under a short corn crop 
Expectations $0.1175 $0.1193 $0.1210 $0.1229 $0.1247 
Standard Deviation $0.10 $0.13 $0.14 $0.16 $0.18 
Price Volatility 84% 105% 116% 129% 147% 
Table 12 RIN prices under a short corn crop scenario 
 
Compared to the baseline, expected RIN prices increase by about $0.02 (up 20%). 
However, if we assume away the banking and borrowing provisions, expected 2010 RIN 
prices will increase by $0.31(up 310%). Banking and borrowing provisions greatly smooth 
out the effects of a negative supply shock in 2010 and reduce the volatility of RIN prices. 
Positive supply shocks 
A positive supply shock can happen with a bumper crop which decreases corn prices, 
and subsequently decrease the feedstock cost for ethanol production which results in 
increased ethanol production. The decreased cost of blending ethanol decreases expected 
RIN prices. We characterize our positive supply shock as a bumper crop in 2010 of 174 
bushels per acre. Table 13 lists the expectation, standard deviation, and price volatility of 
RIN prices for each year under this scenario. 
 
RIN Prices 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
 
Results under a bumper corn crop 
Expectations $0.0811 $0.0823 $0.0836 $0.0848 $0.0861 
Standard Deviation $0.08 $0.10 $0.11 $0.13 $0.15 
Price Volatility 93% 120% 133% 150% 177% 
Table 13 RIN prices under a bumper corn crop scenario 
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If U.S. corn farmers harvest about 174 bushels per acre on average, the expected RIN 
prices drop by about $0.02 (down 20%) compared to the baseline. The standard deviation of 
each RIN price distribution drops as well. If we do not allow for banking and borrowing, 
expected RIN prices for 2010 will drop to zero because the mandate is now easy to meet. 
Banking and borrowing provision again greatly smooth out the positive effects and reduce 
the RIN price volatility. 
Conclusions 
Tradable credit/permit programs are becoming the preferred implementation method 
when governments issue binding aggregate restrictions on the outcomes of private decisions. 
From fisheries quotas to greenhouse gas reduction, tradable permit programs are being 
implemented as the least cost method of achieving desired outcomes. Because it is so new, 
the market for tradable Renewable Fuel Credits is not well understood by either market 
participants or by other affected parties. But new Renewable Fuel Credits markets will be 
created for conventional biofuels, biodiesel, advanced biofuels, and cellulosic-based biofuels 
over the next few years. In this paper we provide a conceptual framework for how these 
markets will operate. We show how the banking and borrowing provisions give structure to 
how RIN prices will vary over time. We estimate that RIN price volatility will be quite high. 
This likely will increase the demand for greater ability to hedge future RIN price risk. We 
estimate call option prices for futures Renewable Fuel Credits which would provide buyers 
of the call option a hedge against rising RIN prices in the future. 
One extension of this research should include an accounting for the probability that 
EPA will provide a waiver for firms' RFS obligations. EPA denied just such a request by 
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Governor Perry of Texas in 2008. But similar requests by the U.S. livestock industry and by 
ethanol blenders will occur if low crude oil prices or low corn yields lead to sharp increases 
in the price of RINs. Any waiver would decrease the volatility of RIN prices, thereby 
lowering the cost of call options on future RIN prices. 
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CHAPTER 4. ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF US ETHANOL MARKET 
SHOCKS ON GLOBAL CRUDE OIL AND US GASOLINE: A 
STRUCTURAL VAR APPROACH 
Introduction 
In 2005, Cambridge Economic Research Associates (CERA) representatives told the 
U.S. House of Representatives that world crude oil production capacity "has the potential to 
rise from 87 million barrels per day (mbd) in 2005 to as much as 108 mbd by 2015, with 
further growth in capacity continuing after that point we see no evidence to suggest a peak 
before 2020, nor do we see a transparent and technically sound analysis from another source 
that justifies belief in an imminent peak." Couple this expanding abundance of crude oil with 
the world's increasing demand for transportation fuels from 2005 to 2008 and one would 
expect to see an increase in crude oil supply. However, crude oil supply was stagnant from 
2005 to 2008 (Figure 8). 
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Figure 8 Monthly global oil supply 
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This three-year period of stagnation in world crude oil supply cannot be explained by 
the global financial crisis. Over the same period, real global GDP grew by 10.83%.
33
 The 
GDP of the United States did shrink during the second half of 2008, but not enough to offset 
the previous 2.5 years of strong growth. In total, the real US GDP still grew 5.33% over the 
three year period.
34
 
Hamilton (2009) argues that the stagnation of crude oil supply can be attributed to 
political instability that disrupted the flow of oil, slower than expected addition of new fields, 
and declining production from existing mature fields. However, this explanation does not 
take into account how much more transportation fuel is being used each day. For example, 
according to the Washington Post, China alone is adding more than 1,000 cars to their streets 
each day.
35
 People from other emerging countries are driving more as well.
36
 Killian (2010) 
argues that the stagnation is due to a lack of exploration and drilling. This explanation, 
however, is a contradiction to the testimony given by CERA. These arguments may have 
some explanatory power, but the gap between oil supply and growing demand suggests to us 
an alternative reasoning. 
We hypothesize that the ever increasing support for alternative fuels is at least one of 
the contributing factors to the stagnant oil supply in the presence of an increasing world 
demand for transportation fuel. Responding to the previous mandate and high energy prices, 
U.S. ethanol production increased from 4 billion gallons in 2005 (3% of US gasoline 
                                                 
33
 Real global GDP is calculated by nominal GDP divided by GDP deflator. World GDP and GDP deflator 
data are from World Bank's World Development Indicators. 
34
 http://www.bea.gov/national/index.htm#gdp   
35
 “Creating a car culture in China” by Maureen Fan, Washington Post Foreign Service, Jan21, 2008. 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/01/20/AR2008012002388.html   
36
 “Mass car ownership in the emerging market giants” by Marcos Chamon, Paolo Mauro, and Yohei 
Okawa, Economic Policy, Issue 54, April 2008. 
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consumption) to 9 billion gallons in 2008 (6.25% of US gasoline consumption) (Figure 9). 
Meanwhile, global biofuels production increased from 618.8 thousand barrels per day in 
2005 to 1055.8 thousand barrels per day in 2008, accounting for about 1.25% of global fuel 
production. The purpose of the paper is to thoroughly examine the possible impact of ethanol 
market shocks on traditional fossil fuel markets. Du and Hayes (2009) measure the impact of 
U.S. ethanol production on gasoline price and profitability of U.S. oil refiners, while treating 
global oil prices fully exogenous. However, the literature (e.g., Barsky and Killian 2002, 
2004) suggests that energy prices must be treated as fully endogenous. This implies that Du 
and Hayes (2009)’s findings that ethanol significantly reduces the price consumers pay for 
gasoline might not be robust to relaxing this assumption. To fully examine the impact of 
policy led ethanol production, we develop a joint model of the global crude oil market, the 
U.S. gasoline market and the U.S. ethanol market. This approach allows us to view all market 
impacts on one another as endogenous.  
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Figure 9 Monthly U.S. ethanol production 
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Our joint model builds on a recently proposed structural vector autoregression 
(SVAR) model of the global market for crude oil and the U.S. market for motor gasoline by 
Killian (2009, 2010). A VAR approach consists of regressing each current variable in the 
model on all the model variables lagged a specified number of times. VAR is a reduced-form 
approach, so economic interpretation of the results is difficult unless the reduced form is 
linked to an economic model. SVARs impose an economic model on the contemporaneous 
movements of the variables.
37
 As such, they allow for the identification of the parameters of 
the economic model and the structural shocks. This technique provides a unique 
decomposition of economic time series (prices or quantities) into demand and supply shocks. 
Killian (2009, 2010) argues that it is essential to understand the origins of a given price 
shock, when assessing the responses of prices and quantities, because each demand and 
supply shock is associated with responses of a different magnitude, pattern and persistence. 
We therefore identify the underlying demand and supply shocks in these three markets and 
assess the responses of prices and quantities of each market to unanticipated shifts in demand 
and supply. Estimates of this joint model suggest that each demand and supply shock has its 
own distinct dynamic effect on the production and real price of imported crude oil. We also 
evaluate the overall importance of each shock for the determination of the real prices of 
crude oil, U.S. gasoline and ethanol. 
Our results show that the responses of the rate of global oil production to an 
unanticipated ethanol demand expansion, largely driven by U.S. government policy, is 
                                                 
37
 The origins of the Structural VAR approach come from the seminal contributions of Sims (1986), 
Bernanke (1986), and Blanchard and Watson (1986), who employed economic theory to recover the structure of 
disturbances. Structural VAR models are now a major tool in macroeconomic analysis of monetary, fiscal, and 
technology shocks (Enders, 2004). 
 76 
statistically significant. This response would not be picked up through a conventional 
regression model because its effect is not one directional, but instead sends a shockwave with 
two peaks and two troughs within a 12 month period. We also find statistically significant 
negative responses of gasoline price to ethanol demand and supply expansions, consistent 
with the results of Du and Hayes (2009). However, we do not find statistically significant 
effect of U.S. ethanol demand or supply expansion on the real price of crude oil or the 
growth rate of U.S. gasoline consumption.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the structural 
VAR model, Section 3 describes the data for estimation, Section 4 summarizes the results 
from impulse response analysis, Section 5 explains the results of variance decomposition, 
and Section 6 concludes with a brief summary of the paper. 
The Structural VAR (SVAR) Model 
To examine the impact of ethanol on global crude oil and U.S. gasoline markets, a 
seven-variable SVAR of these three markets is developed. The seven monthly variables are 
( , , , , , , )t t t t t t t tx prodo rea rpo rpg consg rpe prode

    , where tprodo  is percentage change 
in global crude oil production, trea  is real global economic activity used in Killian (2009), 
trpo  is the real price of crude oil, trpg  is the real price of U.S. RBOB gasoline
38
, tconsg  is 
percentage change in U.S. gasoline consumption, trpe  is the real price of ethanol, and 
                                                 
38
 "Reformulated gasoline blendstock for oxygenate blending" (RBOB) is motor gasoline blending 
components intended for blending with oxygenates to produce finished reformulated gasoline. The price of 
RBOB gasoline excludes the cost of ethanol, which is a type of oxygenate.  
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tprode  is level change in U.S. ethanol production
39
. Our SVAR model provides estimates 
of the impacts that ethanol demand and supply shocks have on the markets of global crude oil 
and U.S. gasoline. We propose that the following seven variables are driven by seven 
structural shocks: (1) oil supply shocks; (2) aggregate demand shocks; (3) oil-market specific 
demand shocks; (4) gasoline supply shocks; (5) gasoline demand shocks; (6) ethanol demand 
shocks and; (7) ethanol supply shocks. Shocks are conceptually defined here as demand or 
supply curve shifts that are not anticipated by the SVAR model. For example, oil supply 
shocks are defined as unanticipated shifts to the oil supply curve. This may occur because of 
an exogenous political event, such as the civil unrest in Venezuela (December 2002) or the 
Iraq war (March 2003). Aggregate demand shocks are defined as unanticipated shifts of the 
demand curve for all industrial commodities in global markets. One example of aggregate 
demand shocks is the shift in the demand for industrial commodities caused by the 
emergence of industrial economies in Asia. Oil specific demand shocks are defined as 
unanticipated shifts of the demand curve for crude oil. An example of an oil specific demand 
shock is higher precautionary demand associated with fears about future oil supply. One 
historical example is the increase of the demand for oil right before the Iraq war (March 
2003). Gasoline supply shocks are defined as unanticipated shifts of gasoline supply curve. 
Examples of gasoline supply shocks include refinery fires that shut down the operation of 
U.S. refiners and reduce the domestic supply of gasoline or changes in regulations that 
restrict refinery output. Ethanol demand shocks are defined as unanticipated shifts of ethanol 
                                                 
39
 US ethanol is an infant industry and the size of ethanol industry is growing exponentially. Given the 
different size of the industry in 1994 and 2008, a 5 percent change in production in 1994 is very different from a 
5 percent change in 2008.  Therefore, we do not use percentage change, instead use level changes to measure 
changes in U.S. ethanol production.   
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demand curves. Examples of ethanol demand shocks include changes in regulations that 
support ethanol, such as the phase out of MTBE
40
, the reduction of tax credits to ethanol 
blenders, and the introduction of Renewable Fuel Standard. Ethanol supply shocks are 
defined as unanticipated shifts of the ethanol supply curve. Examples of ethanol supply 
shocks include unanticipated feedstock price increases led by feedstock supply shortage 
resulting from a bad crop. 
The effects of these seven shocks on our seven variables of interest are evaluated to 
determine which are statistically significant, when they become significant and how long 
they remain significant. The structural VAR representation is: 
(29)  0
1
p
t i t i t
i
A x A x 

  
 
 
where p is the lag order, and t  denotes the vector of serially and mutually uncorrelated 
structural innovations. 
The reduced-form VAR representation is: 
(30)  
1 1
0 0
1
p
t i t i t
i
x A A A x e  

  
 
 
If 1
0A
  is known, the dynamic structure represented by structural VAR could be 
calculated from the reduced-form VAR coefficients, and the structural shocks t  can be 
derived from estimated residuals 0 .t tA e   Coefficients in 
1
0A
  are unknown, so 
identification of structural parameters is achieved by imposing theoretical restrictions to 
                                                 
40
 MTBE (methyl tertiary butyl ether) has been a popular gasoline additive used as an oxygenator and to 
raise octane levels until it was discovered to cause groundwater contamination. Many states banned MTBE, 
thus fuel blenders were led to other alternatives, like ethanol.  
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reduce the number of unknown structural parameters to be less than or equal to the number of 
estimated parameters in the VAR residual variance-covariance matrix. Specifically, the 
covariance matrix for the residuals, 
e , is 
(31)  1 1 1 1
0 0 0 0( ) ( )e t t t tE e e A E A A A 
          
 
 
where E  is the unconditional expectation operator, and   is the covariance matrix for the 
shocks. As there are 21 unique elements in ,e  we impose the following recursive structure 
on  1
0A
  such that the reduced-form errors te  can be decomposed according to
1
0t te A 
 :    
(32)  
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The recursive structure of the structural VAR model is achieved by assuming that not 
all variables of interest will respond to shocks contemporaneously. All of these assumptions 
can be read from the previous equation 1
0t te A 
 . For example, we assume that global crude 
oil producers take at least one month to respond to all shocks except for those on crude oil 
supply. We impose this restriction by making all values on the top row of the 1
0A
  matrix zero 
except for α11.
41
 Fewer contemporaneous response restrictions are placed on more localized 
variables of interest to reflect the smaller (more agile) nature of these markets. A multi-
national industry so dependent on large amounts of capital investment, such as the global 
                                                 
41 
We must allow contemporaneous response in crude oil production to crude oil supply because crude oil 
producers are the cause of crude oil supply shocks.  
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crude oil market, takes time to respond to changes in the global economy. Allowing 
contemporaneous responses to shocks would only be appropriate for smaller and thus more 
agile industries. For this reason we allow the US gasoline market variables 
trpg  and 
tconsg  to respond to contemporaneous shocks to global shocks such as those on oil supply 
and aggregate demand, but not contemporaneous shocks to the much smaller ethanol market. 
Following this logic, even fewer restrictions are placed on much smaller (more agile) ethanol 
market than the US gasoline market. Beyond these restrictions on the contemporaneous 
feedback at monthly frequency, the model allows all feedback among all variables within and 
across blocks, consistent with the well-established notion that energy prices must be treated 
as fully endogenous (see, e.g. Barsky and Killian 2002, 2004). 
A contemporaneous response restriction is equivalent to assuming that a demand (or 
supply) curve is perfectly elastic (or inelastic) in the short-run. First, allowing only α11 in the 
first row of 1
0A
  to be non-zero is equivalent to assuming a perfectly inelastic short-run 
(within a month) supply curve of crude oil (conditional on all lagged variables). The rationale 
for this assumption is that changing oil production is costly. Oil producers set production 
based on expected trend growth in demand. They do not revise the production level in 
response to unpredictable high-frequency variation in the demand for oil, since changes in 
the trend growth of demand are difficult to detect at high frequency. This view is consistent 
with evidence from interviews of Saudi officials in the early 1980s (see Daniel Yergin 
1992).
42
 Second, restricting α47 to be zero is equivalent to assuming a perfectly elastic short-
                                                 
42
 The use of a vertical short-run oil supply assumption is convenient, but is not necessary. It can be shown 
that similar results could be obtained by relaxing the exclusion restrictions on the impact multiplier matrix and 
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run (within a month) supply curve of US gasoline. Following Killian (2010), we assume that 
gasoline distributors have enough gasoline stored to supply the required quantities of 
gasoline at the current retail price, which is assumed to be effectively set by U.S. refiners. 
Domestic refiners set retail prices by adding a markup to the price of imported crude oil, and 
are price takers in the global crude oil market. Increases in the price of imported crude oil are 
being passed on by refiners to the retail price of gasoline within the same month. Third, 
restricting α67 to be zero is equivalent to assuming a perfectly elastic short-run (within a 
month) demand for US ethanol. Because ethanol substitutes gasoline, we assume that 
consumers will use up all the ethanol supplied within a month, when ethanol is priced to 
reflect its energy value based on gasoline price. 
 
Data 
The sample period of 1994:01-2009:02 begins with the availability of monthly 
ethanol production data from the US Department of Energy. We collect monthly data for 
world oil supply
43
, imported crude oil prices
44
, New York harbor RBOB gasoline prices
45
, 
U.S. product supplied of finished motor gasoline
46
, and U.S. oxygenate plant production of 
fuel ethanol
47
 from the Energy Information Administration. Nominal ethanol prices data are 
                                                                                                                                                       
replacing them with sign restrictions in conjunction with bounds on the implied impact oil supply elasticity 
(Killian and Murphy 2009). 
43
 http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/IEDIndex3.cfm?tid=50&pid=53&aid=1  
44
 http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/steo/pub/fsheets/real_prices.html  
45
 http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=RBOB-NYH&f=M  
46
 http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=MGFUPUS1&f=M  
47
 http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/pet_pnp_oxy_dc_nus_mbbl_m.htm 
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obtained from the official Nebraska government website
48
. Following Killian, nominal prices 
and indexes are deflated using the US CPI. Specifically, real prices and real Baltic Exchange 
Dry Indexes are computed by dividing the nominal prices in a given month by the ratio of the 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) in that month to the CPI in September of 2009. Figure 10 
depicts the monthly real prices of crude oil, US gasoline, and US ethanol. Because finished 
motor gasoline includes all ethanol blended gasoline, U.S. gasoline consumption in Figure 11 
is approximated by U.S. product supplied of finished motor gasoline minus U.S. oxygenate 
plant production of fuel ethanol.  
Following Killian (2009, 2010), the real economic activity index is proxied by the 
real average close prices of Baltic Exchange Dry Index (Figure 12). A series of Killian’s 
paper show that oil supply shock measures alone do not explain the bulk of oil price 
fluctuations and thus demand shocks play an important role. To quantify these demand 
shocks we need an index that capture shifts in the demand for industrial commodities driven 
by the global business cycle. Killian proposes to use the dry cargo single voyage ocean 
freight rates, such as Baltic Exchange Dry Index. The reasoning for using the freight rate to 
capture the shifts in the demand for industrial commodities are explained by Killian (2009) as 
following. Even though the supply curve of shipping is relatively flat at low levels of freight 
volumes in the short and intermediate run (Stopford 1997), as idle ships may be reactivated 
or active ships may simply cut short layovers and run faster; the slope of the supply curve 
becomes increasingly steep and freight rates increase, as the demand schedule for shipping 
services shifts due to increased economic activity. At full capacity the supply curve becomes 
                                                 
48
 http://www.neo.ne.gov/statshtml/66.html  
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effectively vertical, as all available ships are operational and running at full speed. Only in 
the long run will additional shipbuilding lower freight rates, often a time when the initial high 
levels of economic activity have already subsided. Following a global business cycle 
upswing there is likely to be a rather drawn-out trough period in the shipping market, as new 
ships are still being launched, long after the business cycle peak has passed, and excess 
capacity of shipping prevails. Only gradually will the scrapping of older ships and rising 
demand due to the business cycle offset this depression in the shipping market. 
 
 
Figure 10 Monthly real prices of crude oil, US gasoline and ethanol  
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Figure 11 Monthly U.S. gasoline consumption excluding ethanol (thousand barrels)  
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Figure 12 Monthly real Baltic Dry Index 
 
Following Killian (2009,2010), we transform the data of monthly global oil supply to 
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the growth rate of global oil supply; and remove seasonal variation from the data of monthly 
U.S. gasoline consumption and then transform them to a monthly growth rate of U.S. 
gasoline consumption. Real prices in levels are used
49
, and real global economic activity 
indexes are detrended
50
.     
All transformed variables are tested for a unit root using the augmented Dickey-Fuller 
test with an intercept and trend shown in the equation below; where y is the time-series 
variable and 
0 1 1, , , , , pv     are parameters.   
(33)  0 1 1 1
2
p
t t i t i t
i
y t vy y     

      
 
 
We can reject the hypothesis of existence of a unit root at 10% significance level for all 
variables.
51
  
All transformed variables are evaluated for seasonality. The existence of a trend and 
seasonality with monthly frequency is tested by estimating the model: 
(34)  
11
0
1
t i i t
i
y wt MD  

   
 
 
where y  is the time-series variable; 1iMD   if month i, 0  otherwise; and 0 1 11, , , ,w    
are parameters. We reject the joint hypothesis of no monthly seasonality for monthly real 
                                                 
49
 Economic theory suggests a link between cyclical fluctuations in global real activity and real prices of 
oil, thus real price of gasoline and ethanol. 
50
 Real Baltic Dry indexes seem to have an upward trend if viewed over the sample period. However, over 
a longer sample period, Killian shows there exists a secular decline in shipping rate. For analysis, we use the 
transformed data of the index for the real global economic activity in industrial commodity markets provided by 
Killian at the following website http://www-personal.umich.edu/~lkilian/reaupdate.txt.  
51
 The advantage of level specification is that the VAR estimates remain consistent whether the real prices 
are integrated or not. Moreover, standard inference on impulse responses based on VAR(p) models, p>1, in 
levels, will remain asymptotically valid. Inference also is asymptotically unvarying to the possible presence of 
cointegration among these real price series (see, e.g., Sims, Stock and Watson 1990; Lütkepohl and Reimers 
1992). Estimates would be inconsistent if we falsely impose cointegration and/or unit root.  
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gasoline prices with 5% significance, so the seasonal variation of monthly real gasoline 
prices is removed. We cannot reject the joint hypothesis of no seasonality with monthly 
frequency at 5% significance for real crude oil prices and real ethanol prices. We reject the 
hypothesis of a linear trend in real crude oil prices over the period 1970-2009.
52
 After making 
these transformations we test again for unit roots and reject the null hypothesis of existence 
of a unit root at 10% significance level for all seven transformed data series.
53
 
At the 1% significance level, employing a variance ratio test, prices exhibited higher 
volatility since 2003. A common practice is to use a logarithmic or Box-Cox transformation 
if the variance does not appear to be constant (Enders, 2004). Therefore, we also run the 
SVAR model with logarithmic forms of prices to check the robustness of our results. 
Moreover, we run the SVAR model with a smaller sample from 2003 to 2009 and obtain 
qualitatively similar results.
54
 
We utilized four methods for determining how many lags to include in a SVAR 
model including log likelihood, Akaike, Schwarz, and Hannan-Quinn. The log likelihood and 
Akaike indicated a lag length of 14, but Schwarz and Hannan-Quinn criteria indicate shorter 
lags. Estimation of the model in a SVAR framework at lag lengths of 5 and 10 yielded robust 
                                                 
52
 Real crude oil prices seem to have an upward trend if viewed only over the sample period. However, 
over a longer horizon including the 1970s, a period of significant instability in the Middle East, the test 
indicates that recent increases in real crude price are not a trend. This is consistent with Killian (2009).  
53 
Monte Carlo simulations have shown that the power of the various Dicker-Fuller and Phillips-Perron tests 
is very low and unit root tests do not have the power to distinguish between a unit root and near unit root 
process. Thus, these tests will too often indicate that a series contains a unit root. Moreover, they have little 
power to distinguish between trend stationary and drifting processes. In finite samples, any trend stationary 
process can be arbitrarily well approximated by a unit root process, and a unit root process can be arbitrarily 
well approximated by a trend stationary process (Enders, 2004). 
54
 Qualitatively similar results include the following. First, the responses of the rate of global oil production 
to an unanticipated ethanol demand expansion, largely driven by U.S. government policy, is statistically 
significant. Second, we find statistically significant negative responses of gasoline price to ethanol demand and 
supply expansions. Third, we do not find statistically significant effect of U.S. ethanol demand or supply 
expansion on the real price of crude oil or U.S. gasoline consumption.  
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and qualitatively similar results. For reporting the results, a 14 month lag specification was 
selected. The model is estimated by the method of least squares, because all the regression 
equations have the same right-hand-side variables, thus negating the need for a Seemingly 
Unrelated Regression (SUR) approach. 
Demand and supply shocks since May of 1995 
We compute the historical structural shock vector, εt, by multiplying the identification 
matrix, A0, by the estimated residuals from the VAR model, et, such that 0t tA e  .Figure 13 
plots the time path of the structural shocks calculated by the model. Observations start in 
1995.05, fourteen months after the first period in our sample 1994.01 reflecting the lags used 
in estimating the VAR model. Table 14 lists the statistics of estimated structural shocks. The 
second row lists the standard deviation of estimated structural shocks. A positive shock is 
defined as one standard deviation above the mean, while a negative shock is defined as one 
standard deviation below the mean. The third row lists the probability of the historical 
occurrences of a positive shock from May of 1995, and the fourth row lists the probability of 
the historical occurrences of a negative shock. 
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Figure 13 History of demand and supply shocks from SVAR model 
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Oil 
supply 
shock
Aggregate 
market 
demand 
shock
Oil 
market 
specific 
demand 
shock 
Gasoline 
supply 
shock
Gasoline 
demand 
shock
Ethanol 
supply 
shock
Ethanol 
demand 
shock
Standard deviations 0.66 0.64 0.66 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65
Prob(realized shock> s.d) 0.15 0.17 0.16 0.13 0.15 0.15 0.14
Prob(realized shock <- s.d.) 0.14 0.19 0.14 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.17  
Table 14 Descriptive statistics for structural shocks 
 
Impulse Response Analysis 
We are interested in understanding how prices and quantities in the global crude oil, 
US gasoline, and US ethanol markets respond to each of the seven shocks constructed using 
the SVAR model. To do this we use impulse response analysis. The reduced-form VAR can 
be written as the following Vector Moving Average (VMA) representation (Sims 1980): 
(35)  ( )t tx B e   
Insert 1
t te A 
  into this last equation to get: 
(36)  
1( ) ( )t t tx B A L   
 
  
where 0( )
i
i iL L 

   and each i  is a 7 7  matrix of parameters from the structural model. 
The above equation implies that the response of t ix   to t  is i . Hence, the sequence of i  
from 0,1,2, ,i   illustrates the dynamic response of the variable to each of the seven 
shocks. Standard errors for the impulse responses are calculated using the Monte Carlo 
approach of Runkle (1987). 
 90 
Responses for each of the five variables of interest
55
 to the seven one-standard 
deviation structural innovations (or shocks) are summarized in Figures 14 through 18. The 
blue line represents the mean impact. Red lines show two standard deviations from the mean 
giving the reader a visual reference of significance at the 5% level. The following five 
sections address each of these figures in turn. Presenting both negative and positive shocks 
would be redundant because they are mirrors of each other. Note that all the seven “shocks” 
are presented as a one standard deviation increase except the gasoline supply shock which is 
interpreted as a decrease. Gasoline supply shocks represent gasoline supply disruptions. The 
contemporaneous impulse response is shown along with the 12 months following the shock.  
Any interpretation of results from an SVAR model is subjective to some degree. Our 
comments should therefore be understood as possible explanations, not comprehensive final 
interpretations.  
Figure 14: How crude oil production responds to demand and supply shocks 
Three of the seven shocks suggest at least some marginal impact on the growth rate in 
global crude oil production tprodo  including shocks to oil supply, aggregate (global) 
demand and ethanol demand. The most obvious of these is the positive shock on crude oil 
supply. As expected, the shock increases tprodo  in the first period.
56
 
                                                 
55 These are global oil production, real oil price, real U.S. gasoline price, U.S. gasoline consumption, and 
real ethanol price. Aggregate demand and ethanol supply responses to shocks are not discussed as they are not 
of interest here. 
56
 This is expected because they are one in the same. If we didn’t see this result then we would have reason 
to believe our model is mis-specified. 
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Figure 14 Global oil production response to one standard deviation shocks 
 
A positive aggregate (global) demand shock has a nearly significant
57
 positive impact 
on tprodo  after two months. However, the lack of a persistent response suggests that crude 
oil producers do not expect shocks in aggregate demand to be persistent enough to change 
production levels.
58
  
                                                 
57 
Significance is defined here as within two standard deviations of the mean effect. This level of 
significance is indicated in figures 14-18 by the dashed red lines above and below the mean effect given in blue. 
58
 Oil producers set production based on expected trend growth in demand. They do not revise the 
production level in response to unpredictable high-frequency variation in the demand for oil, since changes in 
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Shocks to ethanol demand also appear to have an impact on tprodo , although the 
direction and interpretation of this result is not obvious. The shock appears to be followed by 
a wave with two peaks and two troughs. This result could be mistaken for noise except for 
two facts: 1) At the 10% level all peaks and troughs are significant, and 2) The impact of an 
ethanol supply shock shows nothing close to a significant impact on tprodo . The contrast 
between the significant (albeit inconsistent) impact of an ethanol demand shock and the 
complete lack of any response from an ethanol supply shock begs for an explanation. Our 
hypothesis starts with the understanding that ethanol demand is almost entirely driven by 
legislation. The ethanol market in the United States would only be a small fraction of what it 
is today without support in the form of tariffs, tax credits, and mandates,
59
 therefore, any 
shock to ethanol demand is actually a reflection of the change in government support for 
ethanol. Any positive shock to ethanol demand is a signal of government support for 
alternative fuel. On the other hand, ethanol supply shocks are largely driven by weather 
conditions. Our hypothesis is that crude oil producers are going to pay more attention to 
government legislation than the passing weather. The wave like shape of the impact from an 
ethanol demand shock is harder to explain. One explanation is that OPEC may react to 
government support for ethanol by temporarily increasing crude oil supply thereby lowering 
price in an attempt to erode support for alternative fuels. 
                                                                                                                                                       
the trend growth of demand are difficult to detect at high frequency. This view is consistent with evidence from 
interviews of Saudi officials in early 1980s (see Daniel Yergin 1992).  
59
 U.S. trade policy on ethanol includes an ad valorem tariff of 2.5% as well as an import duty of $0.54 per 
gallon. The Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 includes a $0.45-per-gallon Volumetric Ethanol 
Exercise Tax Credit for ethanol blenders. The Energy Security and Independence Act of 2008 mandated 36 
billion gallons of renewable fuel use in United State by 2022, of which 15 billion gallons could come from corn 
ethanol.  
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Figure 15: How crude oil prices respond to demand and supply shocks 
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Figure 15 Real oil price response to one standard deviation shocks 
 
Notice first that the impact of shocks on real oil prices trpo  appear to be much 
smoother than shocks on the growth rate of oil production tprodo . This is largely because 
the oil prices are not presented as a growth rate. For example, recall from the discussion of 
Figure 14 that a positive oil supply shock will permanently increase tprodo . Looking at 
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figure 15 we see the effect of the permanent change in tprodo  is a steady decrease in real 
oil prices. This is what we would expect to see in any market that experiences a permanent 
increase in the growth rate of production. 
   Real oil price 
trpo  appears to be more sensitive to shocks than the growth rate of 
oil production tprodo . An aggregate demand shock causes a persistent increase in trpo . 
Responses are highly statistically significant for months 2 to 4 and months 9 to 12.
60
 An 
unanticipated increase in oil market specific demand causes an immediate, sharp increase in 
trpo  
followed by a nearly identical drop in oil price. This result is consistent with the well-
documented inelastic short-run demand for oil.
61
 Political or environmental events may cause 
hording of oil (and gas) in the short-run, but this hording will likely be followed by a 
subsequent drop in demand as consumers use up their reserves. This would lower prices. 
These results are consistent with Killian (2009, 2010)'s findings, that is, the crude oil price 
responds more to demand than supply. 
The oil price has a significant positive response to U.S. gasoline supply disruptions in 
month 2. One possible explanation for this is that gasoline supply disruptions will cause 
commercial inventory to decrease (because of the inelastic gasoline consumption) leading to 
a higher oil price. This contradicts Killian 2010 who finds that U.S. gasoline supply 
                                                 
60
 If all data series are stationary, the responses to shocks will finally die out. Here we observe a permanent 
increase of oil price responding to aggregate demand increase, which indicates that the transformed data we use 
are not all stationary. The issue of whether the variables in a VAR need to be stationary exists. Sims (1980) and 
others, such as Doan (1992), recommend against differencing even if the variables contain a unit root. They 
argue the goal of VAR analysis is to determine the interrelationships among the variables, not the parameter 
estimates. The main argument against differencing is that it throws away information concerning the 
comovements in the data. Similarly, it is argued that the data need not be detrended. In a VAR, a trending 
variable will be well approximated by a unit root plus drift. 
61 See James Hamilton, 2009, “Understanding crude oil prices”. 
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disruptions reduce the demand for oil and thus reduces the price of oil. The positive oil price 
response to negative U.S. gasoline supply in month 2 remains even when we used lags of 5 
and 10. Killian (2010) used a much larger sample and chose a lag that allowed his estimated 
structural shocks to be more consistent with historical events. Our results suggest that 
Killian's results might not be robust to different lags or a change in sample size. The gasoline 
demand shock effect on trpo  follows a similar pattern as that of the oil specific demand 
shock, which we assume is for the same reason.  
An unanticipated U.S. ethanol demand expansion causes real oil price to increase 
initially and then decrease after 6 months, but the responses are statistically insignificant over 
all horizons. A U.S. ethanol supply expansion may have a small negative impact on real oil 
price after six months. The negative sign is probable because ethanol and gasoline are 
substitutes.  
Figure 16: How U.S. gasoline prices respond to demand and supply shocks 
Real gasoline and crude oil price responses to oil market shocks are nearly identical. 
This is because the gasoline price is largely determined by oil prices. Both gasoline supply 
disruptions and gasoline demand increases appear to cause gasoline prices to increase.  
Ethanol shocks’ effects on gasoline prices are consistent and significant. The negative 
responses of real gasoline price to an unanticipated ethanol demand expansion are 
statistically significant from month 8 to 10. Negative responses of real gasoline price to 
ethanol supply shocks are statistically significant for month 8 and 9. Ethanol is a substitute 
for gasoline; therefore, ethanol either reduces the demand for gasoline or increases the supply 
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of total motor fuel.
62
 All else equal, a drop in demand or an increase in supply will bring 
down the price for gasoline. These results are consistent with the findings of Du and Hayes 
(2009).  
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Figure 16 Real gasoline price response to one standard deviation shocks  
                                                 
62
 Only around 35% of the fuel derived from crude oil is used for gasoline. The rest is used for other fuels 
that do not compete for ethanol such as diesel and jet fuel. The proportion is not flexible making it difficult for 
gasoline producers to reduce the supply of gasoline without also reducing the supply of other refined products 
of crude oil. 
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Figure 17: How U.S. gasoline consumption responds to demand and supply 
shocks 
Notice first how the smooth and flowing responses to shocks in Figures 15 and 16 
contrast with the zigzag patterns in Figures 14 and 17. This is largely because of the choice 
of transformation for the variables of interest. Both crude oil production tprodo in Figure 
14 and U.S. gasoline consumption tconsg in Figure 17 are measured as a growth rate. Real 
oil and gasoline price presented in Figures 15 and 16 are given as a level. 
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Figure 17 U.S. gasoline consumption response to one standard deviation shocks  
 
Also notice that the aggregate impact of all shocks on the rate of U.S. gasoline 
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consumption over the 12 month period is near zero.
63
 This result is consistent with the well-
documented short-run inelastic demand for U.S. gasoline.
64
 Any decrease (increase) in the 
rate of consumption is almost always immediately followed by an opposite response the 
following month. For example, the response of tconsg to an oil supply shock shows an 
obvious but modest increase, followed by a large drop significant at the 10% level, followed 
by another moderate increase, the net effect on tconsg  being at or near zero.  
The gasoline supply disruption shows an immediate significant increase in gasoline 
consumption followed by a significant drop. These responses are consistent with what 
happened after Hurricane Katrina in 2005. Fuel users ran to the gas station to fill up their 
tanks right away, which lead to more contemporaneous demand for gasoline and less demand 
the following month. We also observe a statistically significant instantaneous increase and a 
statistically significant subsequent drop in gasoline consumption responding to a gasoline 
demand shock.  
We hypothesize in the discussion of Figure 14 that oil production responds to ethanol 
demand because ethanol demand is driven almost entirely by government legislation. The 
growth rate of U.S. gasoline consumption, however, does not appear to respond to ethanol 
demand shocks.  This is possibly because the mixed effect of an ethanol demand increase on 
gasoline consumption. On one hand, as a substitute, ethanol reduces the gasoline demand; on 
the other hand, ethanol also brings down U.S. gasoline price and thus increases the demand 
for gasoline.  
                                                 
63
 The sum of the mean effect (blue line) is always near zero for each of the seven shocks. In other words, 
the rate of gasoline consumption is rarely (if ever) permanently affected by any of the seven shocks.  
64
 See James Hamilton (2009), “Understanding crude oil prices”. 
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Figure 18: How ethanol prices respond to demand and supply shocks 
The real price of ethanol trpe  
does not seem to respond to global crude oil production 
shocks. Shocks to aggregate demand do have a statistically significant impact on ethanol 
price but only after 10 months. An unanticipated increase in aggregate demand causes trpe  to 
increase with a delay of 6 months, but the responses are statistically significant for months 10 
and 11. Real ethanol price is negatively affected by a positive oil specific demand shock. 
This response is statistically significant for months 1, 10 and 11.  
Not surprisingly, a gasoline supply disruption increases real ethanol price. The 
subsequent increase in the price of gasoline caused by the shock makes ethanol a more 
attractive substitute. Positive shocks to gasoline demand do not impact ethanol price. As 
expected, both a positive ethanol demand shock and a negative ethanol supply shock will 
increase ethanol price. 
 100 
-.16
-.12
-.08
-.04
.00
.04
.08
.12
.16
.20
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Response of real ethanol price to oil supply shock
-.16
-.12
-.08
-.04
.00
.04
.08
.12
.16
.20
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Response of real ethanol price to aggregate demand shock
-.16
-.12
-.08
-.04
.00
.04
.08
.12
.16
.20
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Response of real ethanol price to oil specific demand shock
-.16
-.12
-.08
-.04
.00
.04
.08
.12
.16
.20
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Response of real ethanol price to gasoline supply shock
-.16
-.12
-.08
-.04
.00
.04
.08
.12
.16
.20
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Response of real ethanol price to gasoline demand shock
-.16
-.12
-.08
-.04
.00
.04
.08
.12
.16
.20
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Response of real ethanol price to ethanol demand shock
-.16
-.12
-.08
-.04
.00
.04
.08
.12
.16
.20
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Response of real ethanol price to ethanol supply shock
 
Figure 18 Real ethanol price response to one standard deviation shocks  
 
Variance Decomposition Analysis 
A natural concern is how much of the variation of prices and quantities can be 
attributed to each demand and supply shock. This question can be answered by computing 
forecast error variance decomposition based on the estimated VAR model. Variance 
decompositions allocate each variable's forecast error variance to the individual shocks. 
These statistics measure the quantitative effect that the shocks have on the variables. 
Following Sims (1980), if t j tE x  is the expected value of tx  based on all information 
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available at time t j , the forecast error is 
1
0
j
t t j t i t i
i
x E x  

 

  .  Since the information at 
time t j  includes all   occurring at or before time t j  and the conditional expectation of 
future   is zero because the shocks are serially uncorrelated. The forecast error variances for 
the individual series are the diagonal elements in the following matrix: 
(37)  
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If ivs is (v,s) element in i , and s  is the standard deviation for disturbance s 
(s=1,…,n) , the j-steps-ahead forecast variance of the vth variable is calculated as follows: 
(38)  
1
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The variance decomposition function (VDF) writes the j-steps-ahead percentage of 
forecast error variance for variable v attributable to the k
th
 shock: 
(39)  
1
2 2
0
1
2 2
0 1
( , , ) 100
j
ivk k
i
j n
ivs s
i s
VDF v k j
 
 



 
 


 
 
Standard errors for the variance decompositions are calculated using the Monte Carlo 
approach of Runkle (1987). 
 Explaining the variation of real global crude oil price
65
 
Table 15 reports the average contribution of each shock to the overall variation in the 
                                                 
65 
These estimates are based on historical averages for the period since 1994. In practice, the relative 
importance of each shock may be quite different from one historical episode to the next. 
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real global oil price in percentage terms. The standard errors of average contributions of 
structural shocks are reported in parentheses. On impact, 94% of the variation in real crude 
oil price is accounted for by oil-market specific demand shocks with oil supply shocks and 
aggregate demand shocks accounting for the rest. Gasoline and ethanol market shocks (and 
disruptions) do not affect real crude oil price within a month, because of our identifying 
assumptions. In the long run (5 years) the variation explained by oil-market specific demand 
shocks drop. Our results suggest that fluctuations in crude oil price are mainly driven by 
demand, instead of supply. This result is consistent with Killian (2009). Our results also 
show that in the long run, with about a 90% confidence level the importance of ethanol 
demand shocks in explaining for the fluctuation of global oil prices are positive. 
 
Horizon 
Oil 
Supply 
Shock 
Aggregate 
Demand 
Shock 
Oil-
Specific 
Demand 
Shock 
Gasoline 
Supply 
Shock 
Gasoline 
Demand 
Shock 
Ethanol 
Demand 
Shock 
Ethanol 
Supply 
Shock 
1 5.34 0.32 94.34 0 0 0 0 
 
(3.53) (1.10) (3.56) 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
2 5.88 3.43 82.54 7.98 0.04 0.14 0 
 
(4.66) (3.15) (5.88) (2.88) (0.39) (0.47) (0.34) 
3 5.67 6.39 80.31 6.97 0.04 0.61 0.01 
 
(5.48) (4.81) (7.64) (3.61) (0.79) (1.55) (0.86) 
6 8.71 11.49 73.53 5.38 0.09 0.63 0.18 
 
(8.42) (8.57) (12.73) (5.23) (2.57) (4.07) (3.18) 
12 9.95 22.86 47.78 5.93 0.44 8.06 4.99 
 
(7.81) (11.75) (11.74) (5.61) (3.88) (7.13) (7.45) 
60 15.83 15 28.54 12.61 11.71 13.23 3.09 
  (8.34) (10.66) (16.27) (6.16) (9.05) (6.76) (10.17) 
Table 15 Percent contribution of each shock to the variability of real crude oil price 
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Explaining the variation of real U.S. retail gasoline price 
Table 16 reports the average contribution of each shock to the overall variation in the 
real U.S. retail gasoline price in percentage terms. On impact, 70% of the variation in real 
U.S. retail gasoline price is accounted for by gasoline supply shocks exemplified by refinery 
shocks. Oil-market specific demand shocks account for an additional 20%, aggregate demand 
shocks account for 5.6%, and oil supply shocks account for 4.4%. In the long run, the 
importance of gasoline supply shock drops to 16% while the importance of other shocks 
increases. Again, our results show that demand shocks from the oil market play the most 
important role in explaining variation in gasoline price. Long run ethanol demand shocks 
account for 13% of the variation in gasoline prices. The variation explained by ethanol 
demand shocks is statistically significant from zero. 
Horizon 
Oil 
Supply 
Shock 
Aggregate 
Demand 
Shock 
Oil-
Specific 
Demand 
Shock 
Gasoline 
Supply 
Shock 
Gasoline 
Demand 
Shock 
Ethanol 
Demand 
Shock 
Ethanol 
Supply 
Shock 
1 4.4 5.59 20.17 69.84 0 0 0 
 
(2.97) (3.14) (5.42) (5.81) 0.00  0.00  0.00  
2 4.05 6.74 33.55 55.6 0 0.02 0.03 
 
(3.81) (4.15) (7.16) (7.11) (0.61) (0.65) (0.44) 
3 3.02 9.94 50.32 36.42 0 0.04 0.26 
 
(4.00) (5.92) (8.78) (7.82) (1.09) (1.51) (1.26) 
6 2.66 23.59 44.16 27.19 0.32 0.83 1.24 
 
(5.45) (11.38) (11.10) (8.23) (2.56) (4.39) (3.88) 
12 4.71 29.98 25.62 18.44 3.24 9.73 8.29 
 
(5.92) (11.77) (9.20) (6.25) (4.57) (6.96) (7.07) 
60 13.31 15.29 23.04 16.44 12.94 14.59 4.39 
  (8.15) (10.76) (16.74) (6.21) (9.52) (6.48) (10.20) 
Table 16 Percent contribution of each shock to the variability of real gasoline price 
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Explaining the variation of real U.S. ethanol price 
Table 17 shows the average contribution of each shock to the total variation in the 
real price of ethanol in percentage terms. On impact, that variation is dominated by ethanol 
demand shocks which account for 87.5% and oil- specific demand shocks which account for 
8.4%. In the long run, oil supply shocks account for 10% of the fluctuation of real ethanol 
price, aggregate demand shocks account for 11.7%, oil-specific demand shocks account for 
28%, gasoline supply shocks account for 11%, gasoline demand shocks account for 14.3%, 
ethanol demand shocks account for 16%, and ethanol supply shocks account for 9%. 
However, variation in ethanol price explained by oil supply shocks, aggregate demand 
shocks, gasoline supply shocks and ethanol supply shocks are not statistically significant. 
These results show that in the long run, the price of ethanol is mainly determined by oil 
market supply and demand shocks.
66
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
66
 This empirical result must also be coupled with the fact that the ethanol industry would not exist without 
support from government legislation. As long as government support continues, the primary determinant of 
ethanol price has been fluctuations in the oil market. 
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Horizon 
Oil 
Supply 
Shock 
Aggregate 
Demand 
Shock 
Oil-
Specific 
Demand 
Shock 
Gasoline 
Supply 
Shock 
Gasoline 
Demand 
Shock 
Ethanol 
Demand 
Shock 
Ethanol 
Supply 
Shock 
1 1.5 0.61 8.36 0.25 1.82 87.47 0 
 
(1.93) (1.19) (3.97) (0.92) (1.81) (4.49) 0.00  
2 2.4 1.18 3.35 5.56 2.58 84.01 0.91 
 
(3.21) (2.64) (2.20) (3.90) (3.43) (6.01) (1.49) 
3 1.71 1.06 3.35 19.24 4.15 68.66 1.82 
 
(3.01) (2.98) (3.12) (7.67) (4.71) (8.67) (3.19) 
6 1.62 1.01 3.82 18.03 8.28 48.99 18.25 
 
(4.19) (3.85) (4.09) (7.44) (6.28) (8.91) (8.61) 
12 1.32 13.81 12.38 17.26 5.71 30.99 18.54 
 
(4.41) (10.02) (5.74) (6.34) (4.99) (6.41) (9.51) 
60 9.92 11.74 28.01 10.98 14.29 15.65 9.42 
  (7.91) (10.62) (16.63) (6.47) (9.22) (7.32) (9.30) 
Table 17 Percent contribution of each shock to the variability of real ethanol price 
 
Conclusions 
The purpose of this paper is to examine whether ethanol has begun to have an impact 
on either the global crude oil market or U.S. gasoline market. To do so we develop a 
structural VAR model of these three markets to examine their interrelationships. We find 
statistically significant responses of global oil production to ethanol demand shocks. Shocks 
to ethanol demand are mainly driven by government policies; therefore this result suggests 
that oil producers respond to the government support for renewable fuel. However, the 
impact is not one direction but instead produces a shock wave with significant peaks and 
troughs at the 10% level.
67
 We do not find statistically significant impact of shocks to ethanol 
                                                 
67
 Discussed in detail in the results section.  
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market on crude oil price, which might suggest that ethanol is not yet a big enough player in 
the transportation fuel market to have a statistically significant impact on crude oil price. Our 
results also show that ethanol demand and supply increases cause statistically significant 
drops in real gasoline price, but do not affect the growth rate of U.S. gasoline consumption 
significantly.    
As renewable fuel production keeps on growing worldwide, it would be very 
interesting to reexamine the interrelationships among these markets after a few years. 
Renewable fuel production has linked agriculture and energy markets together. An 
interesting extension of the paper is to include U.S. corn market to examine the 
interrelationships among global oil, gasoline and corn markets. Because corn production data 
is only available annually, we do not directly model U.S. corn market for this essay, instead 
capture the impact of corn market through ethanol supply shock originated from a change of 
corn price.   
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